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ABSTRACT 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Swaziland have a long history. 
They have evolved over the years and encountered serious problems, 
common to NGOs worldwide, whereas others are specific to Swaziland. One 
of the particular challenges faced by NGOs in Swaziland is encouraging wider 
participation in the policy-making process. 
Swaziland is a highly traditional and conservative society. The object of the 
study has been to investigate the relationships between participation, 
constitutionalism and policy formulation in this no-party state. The research 
uses a literature review and case study to examine the participation of NGOs 
in the Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Policy 2004 in order to illuminate 
the nature of NGO partiCipation in policy formulation. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the rationale, objectives and scope of the study and 
clarifies the key concepts upon which the research is based. Special attention 
is given to the importance of democracy, constitutionalism and the emergence 
of one-party states. This is accomplished through a literature survey, which 
examines the implications of governance and participation of Non 
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in a no-party state such as Swaziland 
operating without a constitution. 
This chapter also examines the nature and origins of civil society with a 
special emphasis on NGOs. A discussion of NGOs and the law is presented 
with special attention to laws regulating them. Then it goes on to explore the 
role of NGOs in policy making and the challenges they face, including the 
agenda setting process. Finally, this chapter investigates the concept of 
participation of NGOs in policymaking. Views presented by torchbearers such 
as the UNDP are presented here and the challenges to participation 
elucidated. This is all in an effort to answer the question as to what the 
character and extent of NGO participation in policy-making processes is in 
Swaziland. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Swaziland has no constitution. Instead, it operates by means of pieces of 
proclamations and orders that fall short of the ideals of a constitutional 
government. A constitution is an important tool for promoting democracy and 
good governance. It enshrines democratic principles such as fair 
representation, freedom of association and assembly, and freedom to 
participate in political life. In the absence of these fundamental principles, 
state affairs are left open to abuse by public authorities. 
In his study of the relationship between agenda setting and public policy, 
Ihonvbere (2004: 6) notes that if the public policy processes in African states 
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have characteristics of constitutionalism, it will result in more people engaging 
in political interactions, such as electoral politics and the issues that make it to 
the policy table. 
The absence of a constitution, in contrast, curtails the culture of public 
participation. This may lead to limited participation in the policy-making 
process, as might be the case in Swaziland. This has been emphasised by 
Kalu (2004: 245), who states that a constitution and processes of constitution-
making are crucial to providing a sense of ownership among the citizens of a 
country and a sense of the legitimacy of the political process, thereby 
mobilising citizens to articulate individual ideas and buy into national dreams. 
They also lead to the spelling out of political rights, and to provision of a road 
map for future generations. 
1.2.1 Objectives of the Study 
The objective of this research is to characterise the political context of the 
Swaziland policy process, and to conduct a case study in respect of the 
nature of Swazi citizens' participation through civil society institutions, 
particularly NGOs, in the policy-making processes of their country. The 
research will thus focus on the participation and contribution of NGOs to 
policies that affect the daily lives of the Swazi people. 
Furthermore, it will examine how the participation of NGOs in policy 
formulation could be improved. It will identify the links between democracy, 
constitutionalism and participation. 
1.2.2 Justification of the Study 
Thomas Dye (quoted in Kalu, 2004: 2) states that public policy is both an art 
and a craft: "It is an art because it requires insight, creativity and imagination 
in identifying social problems and describing them, in devising public policies 
that might alleviate them and then finding out whether these policies make 
things better or worse." In support of Dye's statement, Kalu says that policies 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
3 
have to be relevant to domestic realities, so as to have the desired effects in 
changing the lives of the people for the better (2004: 3). NGOs can therefore 
play an important role in the policy-making process, as they are able to 
identify important socio-economic issues for civil society and to turn them into 
policy issues that ultimately form part of the government's agenda. 
NGOs can promote and encourage democracy because they believe that it 
will make their participation easier with less unwarranted surveillance. By 
virtue of the nature of their work, they promote a bottom-up approach to 
democratisation. In this regard, Kalu (2004) suggests that NGOs not only 
strengthen civil society but also, more importantly, construct an environment 
that protects society from a return to repressive forms of government. 
Like other NGOs worldwide, NGOs in Swaziland can serve as the voice of 
conscience of government (by promoting principles of transparency and 
accountability), and as an extension of government by implementing policy 
through programmes and projects. Thus, NGOs can play an important and 
positive role in policy formulation. Given the importance of their role, this study 
focuses on their involvement in the policy-making process in Swaziland. 
1.2.3 Scope of the Study 
The study concentrates on the participation by Swaziland's NGOs in the area 
of policy formulation. Given that the country is a "no party democracy", where 
participation in general is limited, it is important to examine specifically the 
level of participation in policy formulation. The study thus systematically 
reviews the (limited) academic literature on government and the policy 
process in Swaziland. In addition, it includes a case study of the Draft Policy 
on Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) 2004, which allows further 
conclusions to be drawn about the character of NGOs participating in the 
policy process. 
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1. 3 Contextualising the Literature Review 
This chapter examines important concepts related to the research, viz. 
democracy and constitutionalism. The relationship they have with the concept 
of participation is examined. This leads to a study of the emergence of 
dominant party systems in Southern Africa, which may impact on the type of 
policies formulated by those countries. These concepts are explained through 
a literature review. Since the study focuses on participation in policy making, 
it explores the concept of participation in relation to agenda setting, as it is 
essential to understand who sets the government's agenda for policy-making 
purposes. Most importantly, the chapter highlights the common thread of 
participation that is central to all these concepts. 
1.3.1 Democracy 
There can be no one satisfactory definition of democracy. In contemporary 
debates on democracy, it is commonly associated with a political system in 
which multi-partyism exists, periodic free and fair elections based on universal 
suffrage are conducted, and press freedom, human rights and the rule of law 
are guaranteed (Sachikonye, 1995: 1). 
Furthermore, government and politicians are required to uphold and abide by 
the constitution; checks and balances in the exercise of power exist; and the 
independence of the judiciary and the key role of parliament in the legislative 
process are upheld (Sachikonye, 1995:1). In this discourse the minimal 
definition of democracy requires political pluralism guaranteed in constitutional 
arrangements. These attributes of political pluralism have historically been 
associated with Western liberal democracy. 
Democracy has also been described as government pro tempore. 
Established rules are applied to terminate conflicts, although they are actually 
only suspended. rather than resolved definitely. 
przeworski (1991: 10) explains this as follows: 
Elections fill offices, legislatures establish rules. bureaucracies issue 
decisions, courts adjudicate conflicts and the outcomes are binding 
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until and unless they are altered according to the rules. At the same 
time, all such outcomes are temporary, since losers do not forfeit the 
right to compete in elections, negotiate again, influence legislation, 
pressure the bureaucracy, or seek recourse to courts. 
These processes in liberal democracy are what guarantee its stability and 
legitimacy. 
Since the collapse of authoritarian socialism in Eastern Europe and of many 
one-party states and military regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America, 
Western liberal democracy has become a major reference point for debates 
on democratic transitions in these societies. 
Fukuyama, for instance, argues that there is no alternative to liberal 
democracy, and asserts that capitalist democracy represents "the end point of 
mankind's ideological evolution and the final form of human government" 
(Fukuyama, 1992). Miliband (1992 as quoted in Sachikonye 1995), however, 
contests this opinion, highlighting the fact that liberal democracies are plagued 
by major social inequalities, evident in unemployment, pollution and crime. 
He further states that, despite constitutional provisions in liberal democratic 
regimes, "democratic procedures can be manipulated by elites, and by the 
communication media which they control and do serve to pour out a torrent of 
obfuscations, half-truths and lies" (Miliband, 1992: 109). 
In Sachikonye 1995, Gills and Rocamora (1992) point out that 
... democracy requires more than the maintenance of civil liberties. 
Without substantial reforms and redistribution of economic assets, 
representative institutions - no matter how 'democratic' in form - will 
simply mirror undemocratic power relations in society. Democracy 
requires a change in the balance of forces in society. The case for 
extending the definition of democracy beyond its constitutionalist forms 
so as to include matters of social and economic content is persuasive. 
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Both dimensions of democracy (Le. form and content) and the constitutions 
should not be separated, as they constitute the substance of democracy 
(Sachikonye, 1995: 4). 
Because of the complexities expounded above by Gills and Rocamora it is 
difficult to apply the Western conception of democracy directly to Africa. In its 
simplest form of participation through independently chosen representation, 
however, the implementation of democracy is important and possible. 
Goulborne (1991) states that the founding fathers of post independence Africa 
(including Sobhuza II of Swaziland) failed to promote a democratic political 
tradition when they had the opportunity to do so, especially considering the 
spirit and vibrancy that existed after independence. Leaders at the time were 
perceived as charismatic, having triumphed over colonialism, and therefore 
citizens were enthusiastic to contribute to the creation of what would be truly 
theirs. Instead, as pointed out by Southall (2003), the tendency was to 
suppress rather than institute democracy. 
The specific experiences of the people in the different African countries, 
including Swaziland, who struggled for independence, whether peacefully or 
otherwise, point to the fact that a high degree of popular democratic 
participation occurred during this period of struggle against their rulers and 
oppressors. This experience could have enabled African states to emerge 
with new democratic dispensations. At the time, their populations were 
largely united against the common colonial enemy, which created an illusion 
of oneness by overlooking historic differences, such as social divisions and 
gender. After independence, all these differences re-emerged, resulting in 
fragmented groups that were not equally represented in the new political 
system. 
The 1980s saw the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB) motivating developments for democratisation in Africa in a bid to 
restructure their economies by implementing so-called structural adjustment 
programmes (SAPS). The introduction of these democratisation processes 
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was viewed as somehow distorted. The criticism levelled against the 
definition of liberal democracy in terms of regular and fair elections and multi-
partyism, is that it makes no sense for the mass of African population living in 
poverty. Scholars such as Ihonvbere (2000: 187) observed and criticised 
these obvious and severe limitations of liberal democracy "in crisis ridden, 
dislocated, marginalised and impoverished economies". 
The solutions, frequently recommended, are that African societies need to 
become more democratic, that pro-democracy movements must base 
themselves in civil society, and that trade unions and human rights groups etc. 
must force through a more thorough development of the state. This includes 
restricting the powers of the military, transforming the bureaucracy of 
government, revitalising the judiciary, implementing constitutional 
development, guaranteeing basic rights and liberties, and protecting minority 
rights (Ihonvbere, 2000:188). 
In Africa, market forces have undermined the capacity of states to manage 
economies in accordance with social, ethical and political priorities and have 
accentuated social tensions by destroying indigenous and domestic 
employment. Effectively, globalisation and structural adjustment undermine 
rather than develop a basis for democratic peace and state building 
(Southall, 2003: 9) 
Southall (2003: 19) argues that donors (IMF and WS) recognise these 
problems, and have consequently introduced the concept of good 
governance. This is a way of the state to be seen to be promoting state-like 
structures, while at the same time maintaining a minimum degree of order and 
legitimacy and in effect to balance the contradictory pressures of political 
expectations and economic reform of managing dual transition. 
Southall (2003 quotes Woodward, 1994: 130) saying liberal democracy 
constitutes the only presently attractive option, "since for all its limitations it 
provides some new opportunities for participation and accountability, albeit 
more in hope than in expectation" 
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Democracy in Southern Africa has been re-emphasised in the New 
Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). Southall argues that the 
developing crisis of democracy in Southern Africa is "characterised by an 
increasingly explicit clash between an authoritarian culture of national 
liberation and participatory democracy; and a closely related model of state 
power which, even when disguised in democratic garb, strengthens elites and 
promotes highly unequal patterns of accumulation and anti-development". 
That the sense of hope that characterised the democratic wave, which hit the 
region's shores in the 1990s now seems to be moving into reverse, which is 
rather troubling because developing and maintaining healthy democracies in 
Southern Africa is vital for stability and the economy (Southall, 2003). 
1.3.2 Democracy and Constitutionalism 
The colonialists left Africans without a thorough grasp of the need for 
transparency and accountability on the part of the authorities administering 
state resources for the smooth operation of democracy. Using both force and 
favouritism, African leaders and politicians distributed these resources as 
rewards and favours to their support groups without consideration of laws and 
regulations concerning public interest (Southall, 2003: 9). A clear example in 
Swaziland is that of Sobhuza II and the investment company he established 
(Tibiyo TakaNgwane (TIN» in Swaziland in 1968 for the benefit of the royal 
clique, which has no clear system of accountability towards the citizens. 
After independence, there was a renewed interest throughout Africa in 
elections and constitutionalism. African leaders insisted that, for 
constitutionalism to take root in Africa, it must recognise not only socio-
economic rights but also collective rights, notably those of internally 
oppressed people (Shivji, 1991: 256). This provides a linkage to the important 
debate, in the South African context, of the potential of 'consociationalism', a 
term coined to refer to a constitution that protects and promote socio-
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economic and collective rights according to (Connors, 1996; Lijphart, 1998) in 
Southall (2003). 
Previously, no nexus had been drawn between a country's constitution and its 
methods of policymaking. However, the renewed interest in democratic and 
participatory constitution making is directly linked to a new doctrine of political 
legitimacy that is emerging in Africa's civil society. This new doctrine is built 
around continental and international interests in and commitments to the 
challenge of helping plural communities articulate collective national visions 
for designing and promoting democracy and democratic values. In a sense, 
participatory constitution making is being used to encourage ownership and 
legitimacy around the constitution as a strategy for building democratic values 
and strengthening national projects, thus resulting in a new foundation for 
governance and rational policymaking emerging in Africa. 
For Africa, the participatory approach to constitution making must be adopted 
as a strategy to reconstruct the state and public institutions, to build new 
values and to establish the new networks and relationships that promote 
democracy, social justice and the rule of law. 
1.3.3 The Emergence of One-Party Systems 
A dominant party is a party, which, due to its popular support and/or its control 
of state machinery, is able to remain in power by winning successive elections 
(Southall, 2003). Commonly associated with party dominance are "the fusion 
of the party and the state, denunciation of minorities (who mobilise on issues 
vital to them) and delegitimisation of the opposition. The growth among power 
holders of a "culture of entitlement" to state resources, and even to resources 
not owned by the state, is a further inevitable (and troubling) result." 
(Southall, 2003). 
Southall (2003) sees the collusion of African regimes in their support for 
Mugabe's abuse of power in Zimbabwe as an example of African 
governments' failure to relinquish their power, despite having minimal support 
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of the governing class strategies for accumulation of capital. He points out 
that it is not the winning of office that counts, but rather the ability of political 
elites and their followers to accept the will of the majority and to lose with 
integrity. 
Some have concluded that democracy in Southern Africa centres on 
electoraJism, that it is hollow, and that it does not make much difference to 
ordinary people's lives. This, together with a form of capitalism that is largely 
unregulated, is actually promoting greater, not lesser, inequalities. 
Good (2002:15 in Southall 2003) has illustrated the functioning of dominant 
parties in Southern Africa as follows: 
Issue Effect I Result 
Parliamentary checks upon executives, Have been effectively nullified by the 
as written in the constitutions predominance of ruling parties, which 
operate in a hierarchical disciplined 
fashion 
Parliamentary representative systems in Extinguish the accountability of 
South Africa and Namibia as representatives to their electors 
• implemented via closed party list between elections 
systems 
• Centralisation of power, including 
concentration of power and preferment 
in the hands of the presidency 
• The weakness of opposition parties 
Lack of effective accountability 
Demands for accountability from 
outside the elite 
Encourages autocracy (exhibited by 
various presidents' sense of their own 
indispensability) (Good, 2002: 15) 
• Their incapacity to provide viable 
alternative governments represents a 
"near contradiction even in liberal 
terms" (Good, 2002: 15) 
Allows state profligacy and elite 
· corruption and enrichment to proceed 
· virtually unchecked (unless revealed 
and contained by intra-elite convulsions, 
jealousies and rivalries) 
Deflected 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
11 
Those raising questions Abused or ignored 
Media Regularly brought under control or 
intimidated 
Independent institutions designed to Undermined 
impose restrains upon government 
Good (2002:15 in Southall 2003) 
There is a consensus among political scientists studying democratisation and 
practitioners of international democracy assistance that political parties and 
competitive parties are central features in any democracy. The latter are also 
essential agents of sustainable democratisation, political institutions and 
organisation matters, whatever the state of economic and socio-economic 
conditions. In East Asia, for instance, Shin (1999) says that parties "playa 
pivotal role in consolidating democratic gains". In Africa, similarly, democratic 
consolidation requires, above all, "the institutionalisation of parties and a party 
system." (Burnell, 2000). 
Multiparty systems are the product of several variables: the electoral rules, the 
degree of social heterogeneity, the political culture, and the formal and 
informal institutional environment. Further, the institutionalisation of a 
competitive party system requires the people to develop trust in the parties as 
institutions, which is not easy but must be earned. This indeed is a major 
challenge for most African countries, including Swaziland, as most of these 
characteristics are normally absent or, even if they are present, they are 
usually not genuine but more of a formality. 
Africa has seen an emerging trend towards one-party rule as an instrument for 
control. African leaders have imposed one-party rule in Africa, not because 
"the ruled" wanted it, but because the leaders wanted to remain in power 
permanently (Mushingeh, 1994: 120; Makinda, 1996: 560). It thus seems that 
the first generation of African leaders, Sobhuza II included, feared liberal 
democracy. They thus acted swiftly to remove political choice, contestation 
and partiCipation, and they went even further to erode the importance of 
Parliament and the judiciary (Mushingeh, 1994: 120; Makinda, 1996: 560). 
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One strategy for remaining in power was to silence opponents through various 
instruments, including detention without trial. King Sobhuza II introduced this 
system in Swaziland through the 1973 Decree. To date, Swaziland is still 
under a state of emergency, as the Decree remains in force. Similarly, 
Kwame Nkhrumah of Ghana introduced detention without trial and a state of 
emergency after he rebelled against the Western models of liberal democracy 
according to Adhimbo (1987:190 as cited by Kanduza and Mkhonza (2003). 
Citing Kanduza and Mkhonza (2003), Adhimbo, (1987) observes that in 
Zambia, too, the state of emergency remained in force for twenty-seven years 
as an instrument of control used to intimidate and terrify the population into 
silence, thus reducing politics to leader praising and worshiping. This, too, 
happened in Swaziland with the submissions made to the Constitution Review 
Commission, whose recommendations were that the powers of the King 
should be enhanced, political parties disallowed and trade union elements 
discarded. 
Democratisation should emphasise empowerment of the people through the 
development of social movements, appropriate Civil Society Organisations 
(CSOs) and direct action. Civic associations are sometimes the first to raise 
issues that eventually make it to the ruling party's agendas, but they are not 
an alternative to such parties. White, for instance, has argued that: 
the specific character of political society is a crucial element in any 
discussion of the relationship between civil society and the impetus 
towards democratisation and the broader triadic relationship between 
democracy, civil society and the developmental capacity of the state. 
Potential relationships between civic organisations and parties need 
constructive engagement from all sides and a sense of accountability towards 
each other. Government politicians, however, resent the political 
assertiveness of leaders of civic associations, who are perceived as strangers 
to the electoral process, and query their legitimacy, accusing them of using 
the civic groups for their own purposes. 
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1.4 Civil Society and Non-Governmental Organisations 
The idea of civil society is an old one, and there have been numerous 
attempts to define and describe it. As Seligman (1992: 3) explains: 
It touches on the major themes ... as referring to a realm of social 
mutuality .. to characterise the aspect of social existence, which 
existed beyond the realms of the state. It points, in its different 
articulations, to those elements of both community and individualism ... 
Civil society emerged because of a crisis in social order and a breakdown of 
existing paradigms of order (1992: 15). 
In the article on Civil society, the state and conflicts in Africa, Solomon and 
Matthew (2001) state that according to Camerer (1996: 11), civil society is: 
[an] inherently pluralistic realm distinct from, yet interacting with the 
state and processes of production, consisting of numerous associations 
and organised around specific interests with the following in common: 
communally organised, independent, voluntary, autonomous groups 
with the ability to form links with other interest groups and not in any 
way seek to set themselves up as an alternative to the state. 
In the same article, quoting Zuern (2000: 97), they assert that the concept of 
civil society incorporates "activities in the public sphere between the 
household and the state. This social space encompasses a very broad range 
of human associations with very different interests and objectives." 
Festus Okoye 1, quoting Schimer's Civil Society East West defined civil society 
as a network of self-organised groups that: 
• "Are relatively independent of both public authorities and private units 
of production, viz. of both firms and families; 
• Are capable of deliberating about and taking collective actions in 
defence or promotion of their interests or passions; 
1 In Civil Society Guide to Law Making Processes in SADC Countries,2002 
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• Do not seek to replace either the state agents or private producers or to 
accept responsibility for governing the polity as a whole' and 
• Agree to act within pre-established rules of a 'civil' nature that is 
conveying mutual respect." (1997: 240) 
NGOs are part of civil society as their nature is based on characteristics of the 
latter. According to Weiss (1996: 437) NGOs are: 
"formal institutions that are intended to continue in existence; they are not ad 
hoc entities. They are self-governing through their own constitutional 
arrangements. They are private in that they are separate from 
governments .... NGOs operate beyond and beneath the states in which they 
are incorporated." Michael (2004: 3) echoes this: 
[they] are independent development actors existing apart from 
governments and corporations, operating on a non-profit basis with an 
emphasis on voluntarism and pursuing a mandate of providing work or 
advocating on development issues. 2 
By virtue of the above definition, NGOs are organs of civil society. The work of 
NGOs usually involves 'care and welfare', activities based on philanthropic 
works. These were organisations formed and supported by the middle and 
wealthy classes to provide relief and welfare to the poor and less privileged 
(Michael,2004). 
The term NGO therefore refers to a broad range of institutions that are 
engaged in direct service-activities aimed at benefiting persons beyond the 
organisations' own members. A private, usually unpaid, board of directors or 
trustees formally controls them. In the National Policy on Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) of the United Republic of Tanzania 2001, NGOs are 
defined as "potent forces for social and economic development; important 
partners in nation building and national development; valuable forces in 
2 See also Van Rooy (1998). 
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promoting the qualitative and quantitative development of democracy" 
(2001: 3) 
In summary, an NGO is a voluntary grouping of individuals or organisations, 
which is autonomous and not for profit sharing, organised locally at grassroots 
level, for the purpose of enhancing legitimate economic, social and/or cultural 
development, or lobbying or advocating on issues of public interest or interest 
of a group or individuals or organisations at national or internationallevel.3 
1.4.1 Perceptions on NGOs 
Most governments acknowledge the presence and contribution of NGOs to 
development and the welfare of citizens. They appreciate their helpful nature 
and normally do not treat them as opposition. A reciprocal relationship thus 
exists between the state and NGOs. It acknowledges that the NGO sector's 
weakness complements government's strength and vice versa. If well 
developed and adequately supported, NGOs can be harnessed to 
compensate for the limitations that exist in the government system (8all and 
Dunn, 1995). 
NGOs are often recognised by governments as potent forces for social and 
economic development, important partners in nation building and national 
development, and important contributors to the Gross Domestic Product 
(GOP). Peter Druker has pointed out that in the United States "the non-profit 
organisations have the potential to become of .... equal importance to the 
public sector of government and the private sector of business .... " (8all and 
Dunn, 1995). 
They are perceived as effective providers of services in circumstances where 
there is a premium on flexibility, decentralised decision-making and the need 
for the involvement of beneficiaries in a programme, such as, for instance, 
3 See also Michael (2004). 
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rural development, health, education, family planning services and dealing 
with marginalised groups (Ball and Dunn, 1995) 
1.4.2 NGO accountability and representation 
Both in the Northern and the Southern hemispheres NGOs have been 
challenged to address issues concerning their accountability and 
representation. Whereas NGOs are controlled by and accountable to a Board 
of Management or trustees there are differences in the degree of 
representation of the members. The Women's Resource Centre (WRC) in 
Swaziland, for example operates countrywide. It makes provision for the 
representation of its membership by electing four regional members to this 
Board of Management. 
Although board members are elected, founding members pose a challenge 
because of their special attachment to founding ideas, approaches and 
strategies. This makes it difficult to change the direction or strategy of the 
organisation should it become necessary. 
NGOs are accountable to the wider public through processes of registration 
and regulation. They are also accountable to their funders through agreed-
upon reporting procedures. Narrative and financial reports are distributed to 
the membership, local donors, the business community, organisations and 
appropriate government bodies. In light of this, NGOs working with 
marginalised and disadvantaged people see themselves as representing the 
interests of such people. 
Some NGOs worldwide have made special efforts to improve their 
governance and operations. They have stated their mission, values and 
objectives clearly and ensured that their strategies and operations are 
adequate. Improved management processes have been put in place, as have 
financial management, accounting and budgeting systems. Better human 
resource development and training within the organisation of managers, 
administrators, project staff, board members, beneficiaries, members and 
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volunteers have also been effected. There have also been better means by 
which the organisation and its projects, services and activities are monitored, 
evaluated and reviewed (Michael, 2004). 
1.4.3 NGOs and the law 
In many countries, the law tends to lag behind the reality of NGO activities 
and structures (8all and Dunn, 1995: 39). Many governments still view NGOs 
as care and welfare organisations, reflecting the context in w~lich the 
charitable law of the 19th century was originally framed. Whereas in some 
countries the laws are ambivalent and restrictive towards NGOs, in others, 
there are either no requirements or they are undemanding, making it easy for 
unscrupulous or ambitious individuals to establish fraudulent NGOs 
(8all and Dunn, 1995: 39). 
NGOs face problems of regulation where initial registration and the fulfilment 
of regulatory requirements are complex and time consuming, especially when 
they have to comply with requirements of several different agencies. In 
Swaziland, for example, environmental organisations should be connected to 
the Ministry of Natural Resources, but are registered and regulated by the 
Ministry of Justice and Constitutional Affairs. 
NGOs ought to be regulated by law to protect the public interest. The extent 
of such external regulation should, however, be influenced by the level and 
extent of collective and self-regulatory arrangements put in place by the 
efforts of NGOs themselves (8all and Dunn, 1995). It is recommended that 
funders and governments encourage and support such efforts, as some 
already do. 
An interesting point to note with regard to the relationship between NGOs and 
governments is that NGOs often pioneer and promote innovative programmes 
and policies that are subsequently taken over by governments 
(8all and Dunn, 1995: 45) who in the process sometimes remove the 
innovative aspect and incorporate them into existing public institutions, which 
results in failure. This will be discussed later in the study. 
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Governments also believe that it is unreasonable and may be undesirable for 
public policy to be shaped by what they see as the whims and experiments of 
NGOs (8all and Dunn, 1995). While NGOs maintain that there are too few 
lines of communication for them to share the results of their research and 
innovation with government or to make representations about policy changes, 
governments regard NGOs as secretive and reluctant to share information. 
They also think that NGOs are too ready to publicise matters before 
communicating and debating them with government (8all and Dunn, 1995). 
1.4.4 NGOs and Policy Making 
Several definitions of a policy have been advanced over and above the basic 
one that a policy is a 'statement of intent'. Cloete and Wissink (2000) quote 
definitions of policy from the following authors as such. Derbyshire 
(1979: 151) states that it is a "proposal to do something". Starling (1979: 4) 
adds that it is "a projected programme of goals, values and practices". 
Friedrich (1963: 70) asserts that it is a "proposed course of action of a person, 
group or government within a given environment providing obstacles and 
opportunities, which the policy was proposed to utilise and overcome". 
Closely linked to this description is one by Anderson (1979: 3) who says that a 
policy is a "purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in 
dealing with the problem or matter of concern." 
Again in Cloete and Wissink (2000), Jones (1977: 4) asserts that public policy 
is a process with four distinct phases and renders a more comprehensive 
definition: i) specified means to achieve goals ii) authorised means to 
achieve goals iii) specific actions taken to implement programmes iv) 
measurable outcomes of programmes. This comprehensive description is 
consistent with that advanced by Ranney (1986: 7) in Cloete and Wissink 
(2000), in that it is "a declaration and implementation of intent." This is further 
developed by Thomas Dye's (1978) view that public policy is an art as well as 
a craft. "It why it is an art because in requires insight, creativity and 
imagination in identifying societal problems and describing them, in devising 
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public policies that might alleviate them and then in finding out whether these 
policies end up making things better or worse." 
In addition to public policy being an art, Dye (1978) explains a craft: 
[the] craftiness is in the management of ideas, which are often 
embedded in technical knowledge of decision makers and their 
associates to translate the abstract ideas in governance, social 
structure and statistical data into practical and pragmatic policies for 
society. Thus for the policies to be relevant to domestic realities, and 
for such technical knowledge to have its desired effect in changing the 
lives of the people for the better, analysts and decision makers must be 
cognisant of the fact that changes are derived from preconceived ideas 
about how to correct perceived problems or enhance existing good in 
society. 
A point to note from all these definitions is that policy formulation is a 
continuous process. 
In assessing policy-making issues in Southern Africa, Gaidzanwa et al (2001) 
point out that the colonialists left the new African governments with minimal 
capacities of developing policy analysis in terms of formulation and 
implementation, especially as they themselves did not promote processes of 
public participation. Not surprisingly perhaps, the legacy of authoritarianism in 
the new states was perpetuated in the same way, and political administrative 
structures themselves decreased levels of participation. 
In Gaidzanwa et al (2001), Mamdani (1995), Hyden (1980) and McGaffey 
(1981) agree that weaknesses in African post-colonial state structures have 
led to corruption at various levels of government. Their way of setting out 
development priorities is out of step with the local and national needs of their 
people. This results in the widening of pre-existing power and wealth gaps 
between the poor and the rich at local, regional and national levels. 
Donor agencies have sponsored participation in the policy-making process 
according to their budgets, although with little commitment to investing in civic 
education for the ordinary citizens. They have preferred to negotiate with the 
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ruling elite themselves, as opposed to going through a formal policy-making 
process that involves citizens. Most ordinary citizens who effectively 
participate in national policymaking are therefore those who have managed to 
mobilise materials and ideological and political resources at national and 
international levels. 
Policy making in Southern Africa usually occurs under conditions of 
uncertainty, ambiguity and disagreement. Because policy issues are 
complicated, interrelated, ambiguous and conflicting, it is vital to secure 
broader participation of affected stakeholders. Consequently, a wide spectrum 
of information should be accessed "from a larger number of diverse 
resources" so that there is a sound basis for policies 
(Mason and Mitroff, 1981 as quoted by Gaidzanwa et aI2001). 
Gaidzanwa et al 2001 notes that Social scientists such as Terje explore the 
financial implications of including civil society in policymaking, noting the cost 
implications for an already cash-strapped government. A recommendation by 
some social scientists is to promote public policy participation and the 
empowerment of civil society by means of political power, resources, skills, 
institutions and information that will yield social mobilisation of policy players 
to their benefit. It is also recornmended that the role of NGOs be that of 
strengthening the state and complementing its role without necessarily 
developing counter power to the point of demobilising it. A system of checks 
and balances thus has to be in place. 
More challenging, though, is the failure to undertake a proper diagnosis of the 
environmental context in which policy issues and solutions are based, 
combined with a thorough policy analysis. 
Factors militating against effective policy-making and implementation and 
against the participation of civil society and communities is the inequitable and 
differentiated distribution of political power, and the complexity of the 
development process. The distribution of political power within the state is 
delineated by the Constitution. Formal legislative and administrative 
instruments are promulgated and pronounced for supporting what is 
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expressed in the Constitution. Negotiated political power distribution should 
provide opportunities for civil society and for the poor, disorganised, 
vulnerable, isolated groups to express opinions enabling the poor to identify 
themselves politically and to form networks and alliances that empower them 
to influence policy making creatively and effectively. 
The rural poor in Southern Africa, however, do not take up the challenge for 
various reasons. Chambers (1983) has described them as being vulnerable, 
powerless, isolated, poor and physically weak, thus lacking the pre-requisites 
for sources of political power. In Swaziland, tradition is tightly linked to 
politics. Moreover, tradition is centred on respect. This kind of respect 
influences politics in that the rural poor have respect for the ruling political 
elites and thus limit themselves in political participation. They are oblivious to 
their stake, as well as to their role and responsibility, in participating in public 
policy formulation and implementation. 
Rural folk can be politically unassertive, and believe that a national or 
community concern is the policy prerogative of the elite and the ruling class. 
Kalu (2004: 4), however, argues that this assumption that the masses are 
apathetic in the context of formal democracies may be misleading in African 
states, because the masses have been marginalised, silenced and consigned 
to subsistence living in Africa as a whole since the colonial period. Sub-
Saharan Africa lacks the opportunity for informed and viable civic 
partiCipation, irrespective of ongoing democratisation processes in many of 
these countries. The masses have been left feeling that the state and formal 
authority are ultimately irrelevant to their lives. Consequently, in many African 
states, the masses do not perceive themselves as part of formal government 
(Kalu, 2004). 
Paradoxically, the characteristics and existence of civil SOCiety will depend on 
the character of the state. Democratic civil SOCiety seems to require a strong 
and responsive state. Foley and Edwards (1996: 48) point out that where the 
state is unresponsive, its institutions tend to be undemocratic, or its 
democracy is ill designed to recognise and respond to citizens' demands. 
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In order for civil society to participate effectively in policy-making processes, 
dedicated institutions must allow civil society to determine, debate, process 
and pronounce its policy demands and opinions. Without such institutions, 
civil society is not politically empowered to participate in policymaking. 
Effective participation also requires belief in the right to participation, as well 
as the requisite information and power over the behaviour and policy-making 
processes utilised by political and management elites in government. 
1.4.5 Challenges facing NGOs 
Challenges facing NGOs include division, non-cooperation and unhealthy 
competition, in addition to the non-existence of agreements and memoranda 
of understanding to regulate their relations with governments. One key 
example is the absence of mechanisms for participation in the policy-making 
process. The threats often uttered by sponsors and governments who use 
NGOs for their own ends are also problematic. In many instances, such 
sponsors and governments oblige NGOs to comply with their standards and 
priorities, for example promoting gender or HIV/AIDS agendas. 
Donors sometimes play NGOs against each other by making them compete 
for funds for the same project, which promotes unfair competition and creates 
enmity between NGOs. In other instances, donors duplicate NGOs activities 
(Michael, 2004). It has therefore been suggested that funding organisations 
themselves should adopt a governance approach. This governance approach 
should be clearly articulated and made available to all who approach the 
funding organisation for support. 
A major challenge lies in the lack of power within NGOs. Michael (2004: 177) 
defines a powerful NGO as one that has 
the ability to set its own priorities, define its own agenda, and exert its 
influence on the international development community, even in the face 
of opposition from government, donors, international NGOs and other 
development actors. 
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An NGO has to be able to create space, financial independence and strong 
links to the international community and an approach to development as a 
political issue. This may be impossible, however, due to a lack of access to 
capital (Bratton 1994a; Kasfir 1998) as quoted by Michael (2004). NGOs also 
face the difficulty of planning and coordinating their activities in complex 
ethical worlds, and within different linguistic and religious communities 
(Gyimah-Boadi, 1996). This is linked to their inability to attract and retain the 
right calibre of staff. 
Where the state is confident of its democracy and inherent principles, and its 
system of governance and performance, it will nurture a healthy relationship 
with NGOs. Conversely, where a state has a flawed system of governance 
that does not meet performance levels, it will perpetually feel threatened. 
1.5 Participation in Swaziland 
Civil society participation refers to the involvement and consultation of civil 
society in any process including decision-making. The law-making process 
results in policies or laws that are used in development processes. For the 
sake of sustainability, civil societies need to manage all the processes that 
affect their livelihoods and the economies of their countries.4 
In Swaziland, the participation of Swazis in national decisions has been 
restricted in mainly two ways: The first way pertains to traditional leadership, 
in terms of which the king and the chief are born and not elected (this 
approach, though, is not exclusive to Swaziland). Consequently, minimal 
democratic processes are exercised when appointing councils around the 
king, chiefs and others. Although the king's subjects participate, the decisions 
largely lie with the main figures of authority. 
Secondly, colonialists never encouraged native participation, as they 
maintained separate political developments. Both of these factors 
4 Civil Society Guide to Law Making Processes in SADC Countries,2002: 3 
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proportionately removed vast participation spaces and opportunities for 
Africans. The failure of the departing colonial state and the immediate post-
colonial power elite to appreciate and utilise a people-centred and people-
driven constitution-making approach removed possibilities for responsive and 
responsible public policy. 
Thus, independent Africa inherited a non-hegemonic state that lacked the 
capacity to create a conducive environment for rational, sustainable and 
effective public policy. African elites did everything to by-pass the rules of 
politics, to depoliticise the polity, to intimidate people and their communities 
and to divert attention from underdevelopment and inequality. The state 
became a means of accumulation of wealth and power in the hands of the 
elite, and constitutions were abrogated, suspended, disregarded and 
discredited, as was the case in Swaziland (Kalu, 2004: 241). 
Democracy calls for the participation of citizens in governance, both directly in 
their private capacity as well as through their representatives, interest groups, 
associations, trade unions and religious bodies. Participation generally 
involves identification of issues needing policy intervention, advocating for 
specific interventions and exercising oversight on governance institutions 
(Kwara, 2002). The role of civil society in governance is emphasised by 
Jorgensen (1996), who stresses the direction taken by citizens in debates on 
social development to influence government and business. This can also be 
done through effective periodic elections and referenda. 
According to Mbao (1989), participation is the capacity to influence or playa 
vital role in the decision-making process or in the development of various 
economic and social processes. Participation also implies some form of 
organisation, or at least an attempt to create one. 
The approach used in most instances is the "top-down" approach. What has 
been suggested, though, to enhance participation is the "bottom-up" 
approach. However, Dror (1983) has noted that the weakness of this 
approach is that it allows for the people at grassroots level to deliberate over 
key issues without the requisite resources or tools with which to make 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
25 
informed decisions. This he notes is due to the tendency of people in crucial 
positions, such as politicians, to withhold vital information from the people at 
grassroots level, denying them the opportunity to make informed decisions. 
Some African governments have recently attempted to improve participation 
of the population by labelling their processes 'participatory'. Most attempts 
have thus far been unsuccessful due to a lack of appropriate methodology, 
expertise, experience and a failure to organise the regular consultation of all 
stakeholders. In addition to this, most governmental policy-making decisions 
were donor driven, which means that people were not actively involved. 
1.5.1 Analysing Participation 
In addressing the issue of the extent and quality of citizen's participation in the 
decision making of the state, the GTZ (Deutsche Gesellschaft fOr Technische 
Zusammenarbeit) a German technical development agency is currently 
developing an analytical framework for compiling diverse mechanisms of 
participation and analysing the quality and effectiveness of these mechanisms 
(Gutierrez, 2004). It also provides pointers for developing guidelines that 
clarify the legal aspects of the mechanisms and indicators to ensure their 
institutional mainstreaming within the political system. The participation 
criterion includes democracy and related factors, such as representativeness, 
legitimacy of the mechanism, legitimacy of the political decision process, 
transparency, control, dialogue and strengthening of the public sphere 
(Gutierrez, 2004). In terms of state action, the information basis of 
policymaking is as important as policy implementation. Conditions for the 
peaceful resolution of conflicts and conditions for social justice in addition to 
institution building are also essential. 
The capacity of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) is critically important, as 
far as the participation facilitates the agenda setting process and articulation 
of CSO-related issues. Representation should reflect the contribution of the 
mechanism towards establishing clear rules for representation. CSO 
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impediments have to be identified and addressed. The costs of participation, 
and who shoulders them is also fundamental. 
Community participation can be initiated or motivated either by individuals or 
by interest groups working with the community through "bottom-up" 
participation. It can also be initiated by an individual or an organisation, often 
a higher government authority or non-governmental organisation, working as 
a development agency in the community, though not really with them. This is 
called the "top-down approach. 
One of the international torchbearers in development issues, the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has defined popular participation 
as "entailing the creation of opportunities that enable all members of a 
community and the larger society to actively contribute to and influence the 
development process to share equitably in the fruits of development" 
(UNDP, 1981 :5). It requires the autonomy of citizen initiation in local decision-
making in order to promote self-management' self-confidence and creativity at 
local or group level is another requirement. Of equal importance is an efficient 
and free flow of information in an information network linking the community 
horizontally and vertically UNDP (1981: 6). 
Constraints to popular participation as listed by the UNDP (1981 :7-8) exist 
because of extreme disparities in wealth, income, power and status of 
communities. Other constraints are created by the fact that economic controls 
are often in the hands of a few elites and the state machinery, and thus lack 
the means to distribute resources inequitably. Deep divisions among people 
based on ethnicity, language, gender or age and based demographic patterns 
of settlement limit participation. 
Popular participation is categorised according to how it is initiated 
(UNDP, 1981 :8), that is: 
i) spontaneous participation (voluntary. bottom-up without external 
support), 
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ii) induced participation (sponsored, mandated and officially 
endorsed) and 
iii) coerced participation (compulsory, manipulated and contrived). 
The UNDP emphasises that induced participation is the most prevalent in 
developing countries, where governments often use such strategies as 
motivating and training local leaders to assume leadership roles, establishing 
self-management and cooperative organisation, and promoting civic and 
community bodies ... [but] in the long run, popular participation that is forced 
and lacking in public support will turn out to be counter productive and erode 
citizen interest in becoming involved in development activities. 
Through comparative studies, two factors that significantly limit participation 
have been identified by the UNDP as being the centralisation of the planning 
process and the complexity of planning itself. Further, the lack of information 
and technical data also plays an important role, as do the costs of 
participation in terms of time loss, financial costs and standards. Other factors 
include the negative attitude of planners to popular participation and popular 
resistance to participation because of apathy and feelings of powerlessness 
(UNDP,1981:16-17). It is suggested, however, that participation can be 
enriched through decentralisation of planning, education of communities and 
planners and improved information and communication systems. Moreover, 
the UNDP recommends the active promotion by the government of innovative 
ways of popular community participation (1981: 17, 22, 24). 
1.5.2 Challenges to Participation 
A sharp increase in the influence of civil society in the public debate has been 
observed over the past decade. Gutierrez (2004: 1) notes that their impact on 
the political decision-making of the state has been limited. She partly 
attributes this to mechanisms that have been established to allow for a serious 
representation of CSO interests, which often weigh less in the institutional 
landscape. She notes that rules of participation have no legal binding force. 
In policy formulation and implementation, the mechanisms for participation of 
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civil society are often viewed as acts of generosity of the state as opposed to 
being a binding platform of negotiations of rights and obligations between the 
state and its citizens. 
The result is that the state has the discretion to involve or not to involve CSOs 
in national processes. When it does engage them, it is often unclear whether 
they are being genuinely engaged or merely informed. It is also unclear what 
rights and obligations they carry (Gutierrez, 2004: 1-2). All this is important for 
emerging democracies throughout Africa and for aspiring democracies, such 
as Swaziland. 
Some elements are worth considering when analysing the extent of 
participation. The first of these is information sharing, where the state informs 
CSOs about a particular issue. Consultations and hearings designed to allow 
an exchange of opinions and information between the government and NGO 
sectors about particular decision-making of the state are important too. 
Collaboration is another special feature of consultation, because, although the 
CSOs have no formal means of influencing the process, they tend to do so in 
practice. Joint decision-making, where CSOs are formally part of the 
decision-making actors with a voice and entitled to vote is vital, though the 
weighing votes may practically reduce the influence of CSOs. 
1. 6 Agenda-setting 
A person or group of stakeholders in society may identify a policy issue or 
area of concern, detrimentally affecting them or another section of society, 
and mobilise support to convince policy makers to act on it to change the 
situation in their favour. This marks the beginning of the policy process 
usually called 'policy agenda setting'. Public officials have to be receptive to 
new ideas and responsible private individuals have to be willing to think 
through and offer such ideas and insights that will creatively ensure 
improvement in the economic and political conditions of the people 
(Kalu, 2004: 2). 
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The importance of agenda setting is that it determines who influences or 
controls the policy-making process and that it determines how stakeholders 
influence the policy agenda. In general, agenda setting is the process by 
which decision makers select issues they deem worthy of government 
consideration. Thus, what becomes an issue in the public policy agenda 
reflects the values and victory of government officials whose ideas or 
resources outweigh those of the opposition. 
Agenda setting is therefore both substantive and procedural. The stages 
model advanced by Hogwood and Gunn (1984) show the first stage as 
'deciding to decide', which is also known as agenda setting and is followed by 
the issue infiltration stage. Thereafter comes issue definition, forecasting, 
setting of objectives and priorities. This is followed by the option analysis 
stage and finally the most critical stages of policy; implementation, monitoring 
and control. At the end are evaluation and review, plus policy maintenance, 
succession and termination. 
An agenda prioritises issues for attention by decision-makers through placing 
them in order of importance, with the most important at the top attracting the 
attention, and the least important at the bottom, receiving the least response. 
Jones (1984: 57) asserts that, like perception, aggression, organisation and 
representation agenda setting is about "getting problems to the government." 
Furthermore, the term "agenda ... portrays those issues judged to require 
public action" (Jones, 1984: 59). 
Identification and articulation of an issue does not mean that it automatically 
constitutes the agenda: a pre-screening process is involved. Policy agenda 
setting is, in a wider sense, a deliberate process of planning and action that 
defines priorities, policy issues and problems, mobilises support and lobbies 
decision-makers to take appropriate action (Cloete and Wissink, 2000: 98). 
The surge of policy related issues and the problems that any government 
faces, normally with inadequate resources to address them effectively, makes 
policy agenda setting necessary. Further to this, Swilling (1992: 7) says that, 
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in as much as policy is about power, policymaking is about structuring the 
agenda of social and political life. Consequently, political, economic, social, 
technological, cultural and global factors are pertinent too. 
Crisis plays a vital role in agenda setting. The policy problem must achieve 
particularity, in that it should draw international attention, as exemplified by the 
recent Tsunami disaster of December 2004. The media is important in this 
regard, and the issue can have an emotive aspect. Having a wide impact and 
emotive appeal increases the chances for the issue to be placed in a superior 
position on the agenda. Issues with symbolic value are fashionable for 
government to address, as they give it worldwide exposure and stimulate local 
economies, while boosting the personal image of political leaders. Those 
endowed with wealth, skills, knowledge and resources tend to have more 
advantage and bargaining power as agenda setters. 
Role players in agenda setting include elected political office bearers, 
appointed officials and the media. According to Jones (1984: 59) and Howlett 
and Ramesh (1995: 112), there are two types of agenda setting: the 
systematic agenda and institutional agenda. The former entails a broader set 
of issues facing society, though not all the issues receive government 
attention. In the latter, problems receive formal attention from the 
government. There are four major phases of agenda setting, as an issue 
moves from the systematic to the institutional agenda by first being initiated, 
their solutions specified and their support base expanded. 
Kalu (2004) asserts that public policy agenda are based on the issue, the 
actors, their interests and the available resources they are willing to commit to 
securing preferred outcomes. He notes that agenda setting in Africa is highly 
influenced by outside variables. No sooner will they have made a transition 
from a non-democratic to a democratic dispensation will outside forces set 
certain expectations for them. As a result, they have been unable to 
restructure themselves internally; an example of this is the introduction of 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in the 1990s. Kalu (2004) 
attributes this to the absence of a policy framework and a plausible 
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mechanism for holding public officials accountable for their role in 
government, and distorted democratic interests. 
This can reduce civil society organisations to externally focused, opportunistic, 
corrupt and visionless agencies for pursuing the tentative, shaky and limited 
agenda of 'change' that has been largely packaged and defined from the 
outside. Yet Ihonvbere (2004) asserts that it is only the continuing courage 
and determination of civil society groups and leaders, and especially 
movements of students, women, workers, environmentalists, professionals 
and human rights activists that have prevented the state from going overboard 
(Kalu, 2004: 244). 
1.7 Conclusion 
Democracy and participation are closely related principles, and good 
constitutions draw a link between them. Civil society plays a vital role in 
encouraging participation, strengthening the culture of constitutionalism, and 
influencing the content and context of public policy. Generally, a vibrant civil 
society is important for democratisation and good policy formulation. 
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CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, a detailed background of Swaziland as the country under 
investigation is presented. Swaziland operates under a dual legal system, 
which creates duality in all spheres of Swazi life. These dualities are 
examined here, by examining the modern and traditional structures of 
governance. The duality has implications on policy making in instances of 
pronouncements made by the King in traditional settings. These implications 
are explained in this chapter. 
A national constitution is of paramount importance as it reflects the aspirations 
of citizens and encourages participation. Swaziland has shown a reluctance 
to emerge with a constitution, this reticence is illustrated here, and its 
implications for policymaking explained. 
Regular, free and fair elections are an integral part of democracy, and the 
electoral system of Swaziland is examined here. This leads to an explanation 
of the Swazi Parliament and the Government of Swaziland. The Tinkhundla 
system of government, (a system of government based on traditional 
structures) that currently operates in Swaziland has been criticised repeatedly 
for its inability to decentralise power and services. 
This chapter sets out the character of civil society in order to ascertain the 
nature and extent of NGO participation in vital national issues with a special 
emphasis on policymaking. Mamdani (1996) states that citizens have faith in 
civil society to lead the democratisation process of any particular society. Civil 
society has been perceived in Swaziland as an agency for change, and the 
state as a force that seeks to maintain the status quo. Consequently, there is 
an expectation that civil society agencies will playa prominent part in the drive 
towards democracy and by extension in other processes, such as 
policymaking. 
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This chapter therefore traces the history of NGOs in Swaziland and their role 
and contribution to democracy. In turn, this chapter examines the credibility 
on NGOs as representatives of communities. 
2.2 Country Profile 
With a population of 1.1 million people5, Swaziland is a landlocked country 
covering 17,364 square kilometers. The North-South and East-West axes 
measure 190 kilometers and 145 kilometers respectively (Mzizi, 2002). 
Surrounded by South Africa and Mozambique, the country is divided into four 
geographical and geological regions, namely, Hhohho in the North, Lubombo 
in the East, Manzini in the West and Shiselweni in the South. 
One of the three remaining monarchies in Africa, Swaziland is a no-party 
state, with a professed 'unique democracy'. The idea of a 'unique democracy' 
stems from the fact that Swaziland is a highly traditional country that prides 
itself in upholding its tradition and culture in a changing world. Given that 
many other African states maintain their traditions while implementing 
Western style democratic institutions, Swaziland is not unique in doing so. 
Nonetheless, Swaziland does stand out among African countries for the 
degree to which it has used 'traditional' values to justify the rule of a traditional 
oligarchy. 
Because of this adherence to tradition and culture, those in power accord 
Swaziland a unique status, claiming that the concept of democracy as it is 
known in other settings would not be suitable for the country. In reality, 
though, this professed 'unique democracy' does not in fact meet even the 
minimal standards of democracy, such as having a national constitution. 
5 Central Statistics Office Projections using Spectrum Package based on 1997 Housing and Population 
Census, as quoted in RAAAP (2004). 
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2.2.1 Historical Background" 
Independence from Britain was gained in 1968. This was a smooth, 
uneventful transition, with the country inheriting the pre-independence 
Westminster-style constitution together with a comprehensive Bill of Rights 
drafted by the British in 1968. 
This constitution was unilaterally repealed by the then King Sobhuza II 
through the infamous King's Proclamation to the Nation No 7 1973 on 
12 April. This proclamation vested all executive, judiciary and legislative 
power in the King, and removed the Bill of Rights. This announcement was 
made to the nation from the cattle byre or esibayeni, a traditional setting 
where meetings to address issues of national concern are held. It was 
moreover made in the presence of the armed forces. It banned all political 
activity and parties, stating that the Swazis perceived these as "an 
undesirable element in their society" and "running counter to Swazi way of 
life".6 The decree introduced a law allowing Sixty Days Detention without 
Trial. This move by the King effectively silenced, stifled and suppressed open 
political activity in the country. 
Before independence, there had been several minor parties, viz. the 
Swaziland United Front, the Swaziland Progressive Party, the Swaziland 
Democratic Party and two major ones, viz. the Ngwane National Liberatory 
Congress (NNLC), constituted of progressives seeking liberal democracy, and 
the Imbhokodv07 National Movement (INM) supported by traditionalists, 
including the King. Swazi history tells us that the King was never in favour of 
political parties, and that his move in 1973 was thus really a way to neutralise 
potential antagonism by condemning Western political institutions. 
6 Vilakazi A.L in "Swaziland and Lesotho: From Traditionalism to Modernity" cited by P N 
Takarambudde, "External Law and Social Structure in an African Context: An Essay about a 
Normative Imposition and Survival in Swaziland" (1983) XVI Comparative and International Journal 
of South Africa 209 pp 212-213 says that: "When the Swazi speak of 'our way oflife' and 'our 
traditions' they refer to the social relationships and social actions that take as their point of departure 
age-old customs validated by the ideology of traditionalism and legitimised by the king" 
7 Imbokodvo means 'a grinding stone' in English. 
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Four national consultative reviews known as Vusela8 Commissions were 
undertaken. The reports of each of these reviews recommended the 
formulation of a national constitution that would meet international standards 
and the people's aspirations. During these consultative meetings, a multi-
party system as an alternative to the no party system was discussed9, but 
because of its controversial nature was usually misrepresented (people were 
misinformed and mUlti-party systems were presented as leading to poverty, 
possibly even anarchy). 
A constitution-making process commenced in 1996 but to date, thirty-seven 
years after independence, no constitution that would promote a healthy 
democracy and protect its citizens has been produced. 
In a conference dubbed "Bridging the Political Divide"10 a presenter and 
lecturer at the University of Pretoria aptly described the Swazi constitutional 
developments as "very much like a journey taken by the slowest animal, with 
the capacity to convince its beholders that it is different from the animal they 
might have seen previously - the chameleon". In other words, these 
constitutional developments appear to be evolving steadily, but are never truly 
changing. This is because of delaying tactics employed by the King and his 
clique. 
In order to understand the constitution making process of Swaziland, one 
needs to consider the influence of tradition. The most important constitutional 
decisions are anchored in tradition, such as the selection of the head of state 
and the Prime Minister. Swazi life is also based on an allegiance system 
created by one of the pioneers of the Swazi state, King Mswati I, a regiment 
system of political socialisation that has reinforced the authority of the 
monarchy. Participants in this system have developed a sense of loyalty and 
8 Vusela means 'greetings' in English. 
9 Vuselas II Report: 1992:59 
[0 Proceedings of a Conference on Bridging the Political Divide, 21-23 June 2002, Pigg's Peak, 
Swaziland. p.19 
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obligation towards the Dlamini clan, which offered some upward mobility to 
members of other clans. 11 
2.2.2 Distinct Historical and Constitutional Phases 
The developments with regard to the drafting of a constitution can be divided 
into several distinct phases. The first three of these (up to 1973) are merely 
mentioned, but the remaining phases (after 1978) will be discussed: 
• The Pre-Self-governing Negotiations (1960-1964) 
• The Pre-Independence Era (1964-1968) 
• Self-governing and Post-Independence (1968-1973) 
The other phases up to the present day are discussed further below. 
• Beyond the King's Proclamation (1973-1978) 
With regard to the fourth phase, above, the King's Proclamation to the Nation 
NO.7 of 1973 is particularly important; in Article 3 thereof, the King makes the 
following declaration: 
I hereby declare that I have assumed all supreme power in the 
Kingdom of Swaziland and that all Legislative, Executive and Judicial 
power is vested in myself and shall, for the meantime, be exercised in 
collaboration with a Council constituted by my Cabinet Ministers. 12 
In this way, the Cabinet was reconstituted into a Council of Ministers, and it 
became the only Western type of institution the King consulted. Briefly, 
therefore, the 1968 Constitution and its electoral process were repealed, 
allegedly because of their inflexibility, their likelihood to cause political and 
11 Proceedings of a Conference on Bridging the Political Divide, 21-23 June 2002, Pigg's Peak, 
Swaziland. p.25. 
12 A manual on Civic Education Workshops Council of Swaziland Churches (2000:39) 
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social strife, the inclusion of foreign concepts and the granting unlimited 
sovereignty to Parliament.13 
• The Rise of the Tinkhundla System of Government (1978-1992). 
The Establishment of Parliament Order of 1978 introduced significant 
constitutional changes and re-introduced Parliament through unelected 
parliamentary representation. 
• The Never-Ending Constitution Making Process (1996- 2000) 
Even before King Mswati III was inaugurated in 1986, there had been 
pressure from ... for the removal of the 1973 Decree, which the said King 
disregarded throughout his reign. The political changes in South Africa of the 
1990's allowed and encouraged greater collaboration between the (SFTU) 
Swazi Federation of Trade Unions and the Council of South African Trade 
Unions (COSATU), which had strong ties with the African National Congress 
(ANC). This meant that the pressure to democratise came from an influential 
source. The heads of state of other Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) countries joined this call on the Swazi monarch (Lodge et 
ai, 2002: 326). His Majesty responded by commissioning several committees 
to solicit views and recommendations from the people who had called for the 
development of a new constitution. The combination of the internal and 
external pressure resulted in the appointment in 1996 of a commission to draft 
a national constitution. 
• The Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC) 2002 to date 
The CDC was established in 2002 and headed by Prince David. The 
Executive, Legislative and, most notably, Judiciary bodies were not consulted 
in the drafting process, which is indicative of the political irregularities that 
have marred the constitution-building process in Swaziland. The CDC finally 
presented its draft constitution to the king and the nation on 31 May 2003. No 
13 Proceedings of a Conference on Bridging the Political Divide, 21-23 June 2002, Pigg's Peak, 
Swaziland. p.32. 
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clear-cut adoption process was mentioned, yet precisely this aspect is crucial 
for a constitution to gain democratic legitimacy (IBA Report, 2003: 5). 
Again, people were dissatisfied with both the process and the product. There 
had been no genuine national participation. Stakeholders, civil groups and 
individuals were excluded, and contributions were screened by the Swaziland 
National Council Standing Committee (SNCSC), an advisory committee to 
King Mswati III (ISA Report, 2003: 5). The National Constitutional Assembly 
(NCA), comprised of lawyers and political activists, has also criticised the 
Constitution as being illegitimate and undemocratic. 
Prof Chuks Okpaluba, a lecturer at the University of the North, Pretoria, noted 
that without these principles, Constitutional Law in Swaziland is unlikely to 
develop, as there are no opportunities to challenge its merit. Unless citizens 
go to court and secure a decision against government or authority, 
constitutional law cannot be developed.14 
2.3. The Duality Dilemma 
2.3.1 A Dual Monarchy 
Historians have often referred to Swaziland as a dual monarchy, reigned by 
the King together with the Indlovukazi15 or Queen Mother. She does not have 
to be the King's biological mother. It can also be with a Queen Regent (as 
happened in the recent past)16. This idea has caused confusion. 'Dual 
monarchy' is not an accurate description. The King rules along with the Queen 
Mother, who acts in a consultative capacity, and the Uqoqo advises both.17 
The King may, however make decisions without consulting the Queen Mother. 
14 Proceedings of a Conference on Bridging the Political Divide, 21-23 June 2002, Pigg's Peak, 
Swaziland. 39-40. 
15 Indlovukazi means 'the she elephant' in English. 
16 The late King Sobhuza II at the time reigned together with Gwamile Mdluli, his grandmother and 
Queen Regent 
17 The Liqoqo is defined under Section 144 of the 1968 Constitution as a "Council, the membership of 
which is in part elected by the Swazi National Council from among their number, in part selected by 
the Ngwenyama and in part traditionally appointed, and of which both the Ngwenyama and Ndlovukazi 
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2.3.2 The Dual Legal System 
In addition to being ruled by a dual monarchy, Swaziland also operates under 
a dual legal system, with the inherited Roman Dutch Law (a combination of 
Statutory Law and Common Law) on the one hand and Customary Law 
(indigenous Swazi law based on custom and tradition) on the other. Using 
Max Weber's terminology, Saunders points out that, whereas the general law 
(Roman Dutch Law) provides a type of 'legal' domination, the indigenous law 
is a blend of the 'traditional' and the 'charismatic' (Saunders, 1984:10). For 
these reasons, most Swazis still prefer to use Customary Law. It is also more 
accessible to the ordinary Swazi because of its affordability and expediency. 
2.3.3 The Dual Court System 
The existence of the Common Law alongside Swazi Law and Custom 
translates into a dual court system, as illustrated below: 
Diagram 1: Dual Court System 
Court of Appeal 
t 
High Court 
t 
Industrial Court 
t 
Magistrate's Court 
t Swazi National Court 
Chiefs Court 
Ndabazabantu (para-judicial figure) 18 
are themselves members". This definition has since been redefined at least twice. See Decree No.1 of 
1982 and the Regent's Decree No.4 of 1984, being the King's Proclamation (Amendment) NO.3 1984 
18 UNDP (2003: 15). 
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Judicial powers are vested in the dual system, with the one being independent 
and based on Western Law, and the other being traditional and based on 
unwritten laws and customs. 
Ordinarily, these two court systems complement each other, although they do 
sometimes result in clashes of jurisdiction. An aggrieved party who has lost a 
court case has the right to appeal to the King in what is known as kwembula 
ingubo enkhosini. In recent years, this approach has been applied in labour 
issues or where trade unions have an unresolved issue with employers. It 
becomes impossible to maintain the court's decision if an instruction for 
reinstatement or dismissal comes from the head of state. When there is no 
derailment from the Common Law court processes, however, these two court 
systems co-exist and merge at the highest level (the Court of Appeal) as 
shown in the diagram above. One can thus appeal in a matter that has come 
from the Swazi National Court through the High Court and to the Court of 
Appeal. 
2.3.4 The Dual System of Governance 
The head of state therefore operates in two separate capacities, firstly as King 
according to Common Law and secondly as Ngwenyama 19 under Customary 
Law. This has resulted in a dual government system with a 'modern' system 
of government based on the Westminster system, including a cabinet and a 
civil service, existing alongside the traditional government system based on 
Emabandla.20 A Swaziland National Council Standing Committee (SNCSC) is 
also appointed by the King, drawn largely from a traditional power structure, 
and its members advise the King on issues, including comments regarding 
legislation coming out of Parliament, prior to assent by the King. The SNCSC 
tends to be powerful and influential because of their proximity and access to 
19 Ngwenyama is the SiSwati term for king, associated with the symbol of the lion. 
20 Emabandla means councils in English: These councils are usually advisory in nature and mostly 
made up of members of the royal family. The term also applies to chiefs' councils. 
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the Ngwenyama. The power derived from their strategic position enables 
them to override decisions of the cabinet. 
Diagram 2: The Dual System of Government 
[ Head of State I 
Morlp.rn Tr::lrlitinn::lI 
W p.~tmin~tp.r SW::l7i tr::lrlitinn 
Ngwenyama King I J 
Prime Minister Indvuna 
yaseLudzidzini 
Deputy Prime SikhululChief 
Minister 
Minister IndvunalHeadman 
Regional UmgijimilChiefs 
Secretary runner 
Regional 
Administrator 
(Note: These structures are not necessarily at the same level with the same 
powers but the diagram serves to highlight the hierarchical structure of each 
system.) 
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Municipalities are currently only in urban areas. As such, local government is 
at two levels, modern and traditional as illustrated below. 
Diagram 3: Local Government 
Municipalities/City Councils 
Town/City Mayor 
i 
Chairman of the Board 
i 
Town Clerk 
i 
Councillors 
Tinkhundla 
Member of Parliament 
i 
Indvuna YeNkhund/a 
i 
Bucopho bucopho 
committee 
I 
Executive Council of 
In khundla 
i 
Bandlancane 
i 
Ndabazabantu - para judicial 
figure 
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2.3.5 Explanation of the Duality 
Common to other commonwealth African jurisdictions, dualism (also referred 
to as parallelism) is a system where traditional structures co-exist by law with 
elected councils that are sometimes equal and independent of each other and 
operating parallel to one another and at other times are no1.21 The 
experience with duality in SADC is that it "usually leads to unhealthy 
competition for power, duplication of effort and wastage of resources".22 
The duality in Swaziland has been maintained for a variety of reasons, 
amongst which is the fact that the majority (about 80%) of Swazi people live in 
rural areas. This majority has minimal education, resources and language 
skills, and would be better served by a system that accommodates these 
limitations. It has also been kept to maintain tradition and custom, which forms 
a power base for those in power who benefit from the advantages derived 
from tradition and custom. In addition to this, it was understood by those in 
power that this duality could be reconciled and made to operate efficiently by 
having the Tinkhundla evolve into modern day local government institutions 
on the basis of which decentralisation could be effected.23 Ideally, they were 
intended to develop into local District Councils. Despite these aspirations, the 
Tinkhundla are only local government institutions in name, as they are 
singularly lacking in resources - they have no budgets, no managerial back 
up and consequently no executive capacity. The Urban Government Act 1969 
governs municipalities, while the idea of the Tinkhundla came through King 
Sobhuza II in 1955. 
This duality has caused confusion, as it results in duplication, contradictions 
and conflict. It also results in the overlap of duties and responsibilities, and 
creates gaps in the delivery of services. This is most clearly seen in 
operations within the legal system and in policy making in the country. Within 
the law it leaves grey areas and uncertainty, and in the policy making process 
21 UNDP (2003: 69). 
22 Ibid., p69. 
23 Ibid.,p2 
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it creates confusion because the King as Ngwenyama can make 
pronouncements that have implications on the modern government, which the 
latter has to accommodate even though they are usually unplanned. 
2.3.6 Instances of Conflict between Public Policy and Traditional 
Governance 
There are various instances of pronouncement on policy including those by 
the king. Pronouncements made by the King often constitute policy. They are 
usually made at the Opening of Parliament or in traditional ceremonial settings 
where the king is acting in his capacity as Ngwenyama. 
The first post-independence instance where the King made such 
pronouncements was the repealing of the 1968 Constitution. A second 
example was when a controversy arose about the payment of lobola24 ; the 
late king made a pronouncement that, henceforth, one cow given as lobola 
would be the equivalent of 10 pounds. This is an example of a royal 
pronouncement that had policy implications. 
The current king has continued to make such pronouncements; for example, 
when formally dispersing the emabutfo25 after performing traditional duties he 
could state that they would be paid a certain allowance for participating in 
traditional activities. At the opening of Parliament, for example, the king could 
unexpectedly state that no child should be refused education for lack of 
resource, implying that there should be free education. The Ministry of 
Education would then have to consider the existing Education Policy and 
reconcile it with this recent pronouncement. 
An interesting angle to explore by extension would be the pronouncements 
made by chiefs. Instances such as the banning of funerals on a particular 
24 Lobola in simple tenns is bride price, but it is at the centre of a wide range of social and cultural 
implications. 
25 Emabutfo means warriors in English, and refers to Swazi male regiments. 
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weekday, with fines levied for infringement, tend to become law in the 
traditional setting, even though the courts may not legally sanction them. 
2.3.7 The Chiefs Roles and Responsibilities 
According to Whitfield (quoted in Nhlabatsi, 1996: 5), the chief was originally 
charged with economic, ritual and legal duties in the area under his control. 
The chiefs duty to maintain law and order and to arrest with or without 
warrant is covered by Section 86(3) of the Swazi Administration Order 1950. 
With the weakening of the traditional system through modernisation, the chief 
has lost most of his powers of control over his people. The colonial 
administration deprived the chief of the full power to punish disobedient 
followers. It viewed the chief as a hindrance to progress and modernisation. 
Political disorder set in and almost destroyed the traditional society (DlalTlini, 
1992). 
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Diagram 4: The position of the chief 
King 
r 
Chief 
Libandla i) all adult males above 
r 
eighteen in the community can 
hold audience 
ii) Bandlancane: men 
belonging 
to the inner council26 
Indvuna27 
Umgijimf8 
In contemporary Swaziland, the functions of chiefs can be grouped into three 
main categories. Firstly, the chiefs are responsible for adjudicating cases 
according to Customary Law; up to 95% of their time is spent on this. 
Secondly, they are responsible for administration, which involves allocation of 
land done through the kukhonta29 system. The Chief and his advisors, who 
26 Bandlancane (meaning inner council in English) refers to a group of approximately 10 men, who act 
as advisors to the chief, and who have been mainly selected by him. They are often relatives of the 
chief. Bantfivabenkhosi (meaning members of the extended royal family in English) in the chiefdom. 
27 Other officials also hold the title of indvuna (meaning headman in English), such as ward heads (in 
larger chiefdoms), the Commander of Regiments and the Runner. 
28 The Umgijimi (meaning the runner in English) is the Chiefs Runner. 
29 Kukhonta is a system of acquiring Swazi Nation Land. It is a type of vassalage system 
(Kuper 1947: 67) involving legal and economic obligations on both parties. 
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consist mainly of imisumpe,30 have the responsibility of pegging the area to be 
allocated. This has policy implications in terms of what transpires on that 
piece of land during its occupation. Thirdly, additional duties of the Chief 
include the processing of official documents, such as passports and 
applications for scholarships. The promotion of economic development is the 
fourth function, especially in light of the poverty and HIV/AIDS situation. 31 
The country distinguishes between Swazi Nation Land (SNL), which is largely 
constituted by the land in rural areas, and Title Deed Land (TDL), which can 
be purchased under a ninety-nine year lease and is mainly land in urban 
areas. It is understood that the King holds SNL in trust for the Swazi nation. 
The Chiefs in turn hold the land for the King in trust for the Swazi nation. The 
issue of land is a sensitive and controversial one in Swaziland. Land issues 
are regulated through the Land Policy. However, because of these two land 
tenure systems, they are administered differently and the administration of 
both has policy implications. 
2.3.8 Options for a New Legal system 
Three possibilities have been presented for a new legal system (Duggard, 
1981 ).32 The first is the outright rejection of Swazi Customary Law in favour of 
adopting Common Law, because traditional customs are often linked to 
outdated social and political conditions. The extremely conservative nature of 
Customary Law means that it can act as an obstacle to new developments. 
The second possibility is the total adoption of Customary Law, making it 'the 
general law of the land', and the rejection of foreign law in its entirety. The 
third option is an integration of many elements of Customary Law into modern 
law, retaining indigenous laws that are accurate features and characteristics 
of the Swazi, and only dismissing those, which may be unjust or cause the 
country to stagnate. 
30 Imisumpe are community elders who are members of the chief's advisory council. 
31 UNDP (2003: 2) 
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2.4 Swaziland's Electoral System 
Elections lie at the heart of democracy; in other words, it is through the act of 
voting that government by consent is secured. They highlight two major 
categories of electoral systems: classical and non-classical. Classical 
electoral systems include plurality systems, majority systems and 
proportionality systems. Non-classical electoral systems are no party 
systems, one party systems and semi-competitive elections. 
Non-classical elections are marked by restricted competition, whereas a high 
level of competition typifies classical elections. The latter moreover have an 
effect on the government and its policies, whereas non-classical elections do 
not modify the control of power and policy directions. 
Like many countries, and even though it is a no-party state, Swaziland does 
hold elections. In fact, the extent to which they comply with the demands and 
requirements of international human rights codes is particularly interesting and 
relevant. 
The first post-independence elections in 1972 were conducted under the 1968 
Constitution and again won by the INM with an overwhelming majority. The 
NNLC, however, won three seats in Parliament from one of the 
constituencies. For the first time, the majority party was faced with an official 
opposition in Parliament. This result shook traditionalists in the INM and 
triggered a series of events that culminated in the repeal of the 1968 
Constitution and its electoral laws (Matsebula, 1987: 256-259). Swaziland was 
unfamiliar with this system of government as the nation had not been properly 
initiated or oriented to it (Okpaluba et ai, 1997: 131). 
Stevens (1967: 230) describes how, when the elections were first held, the 
Swazi people approached the king to ask him for which party they were 
expected to vote. Consequently, the king formed the INM out of the SNC in 
order to protect Swazi traditions, particularly the traditional role of the 
monarchy. Effectively, once the people had been told which party to vote for, 
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they treated political opponents as physical enemies (Matsebula, 1987: 56), 
as is the case today. 
It can be said that a substantial percentage of Swazis, especially those in rural 
areas, prefer the Tinkhundla system (possibly because they know no other 
and are drawn by the developmental functions and benefits of the system). 
However, this system of government and its electoral laws have been 
severely criticised from the beginning by both rural and urban folk. 
'Progressives' and some ordinary people condemned the ideological basis of 
the system, as well as its lack of clarity vis-a-vis the roles and responsibilities 
of officials.33 The low level of experience and educational background of 
some of the elected officials may explain the less than satisfactory 
performance of councils.34 The system has further been criticised because the 
elections have been conducted in the absence of parties and because 
candidates were not allowed to campaign (Mthembu, 1992). 
The uniqueness of the Tinkhundla system stems from the fact that it attempts 
to achieve a delicate balance between the Western type system of 
governance and the African traditional system of governance. Okpaluba et al 
(1997: 4) note that its traditionalist adherents pride themselves on their ability 
to operate an intricate web of governmental network in the total absence of a 
written constitution, political parties or even a Bill of Rights. 
Independence in 1968 presented an opportunity to strengthen the Tinkhundla, 
but this did not happen. They continued to be marginalised until the 1978 
elections, when they were used as electoral colleges and parliamentary 
constituencies and their number increased from twenty-two to forty.35 They 
are meant to promote participation in local government and to identify the 
needs of the people in order to assist government in planning its delivery of 
social services. 
33 UNDP (2003). 
34 Ibid., pI 7. 
35 Ibid., p7. 
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Authorities saw it proper to review the system in response to pressure 
groupS.36 (Times of Swaziland: 19th April 1992). The king appointed a group 
known as Vusela I, headed by Prince Masitsela, to solicit views and 
recommendations countrywide on the Tinkhundla system of government and 
the electoral laws. From the information gathered, it was apparent that the 
electoral system needed to be reviewed. Another Tinkhundla Review 
Commission called Vusela II, this time led by Prince Mahlalengangeni, 
unveiled and confirmed previous criticism levelled against the Tinkhundla 
system of government and electoral system. The majority of Swazis making 
submissions wanted the Tinkhundla system retained but "reviewed and 
improved in the meantime".37 Despite intimidation from traditional authorities, 
there was enough canvassing by the progressives to enable opposition to the 
system to be voiced. The Tinkhundla system was sufficiently rejected in the 
exercise to necessitate changes. 
The modifications comprised three laws to regulate the elections, namely The 
Establishment of the Parliament of Swaziland Order No. 1 of 1992, the 
Elections Order No.2 of 1992 and the Voters' Registration Act NO.3 of 1992. 
Election activities are conducted at three levels. 
i. Umphakatsi or community level: where registration and nominations 
occur. 
ii. Inkhundla or constituency level: here candidates from the different 
communities compete to represent that particular constituency. 
iii. National level: where candidates compete to represent the 
constituency in parliament. 
In terms of administering the elections, the King appoints an Umphatsi 
Lukhetfo or a Chief Electoral Officer, and a Deputy Electoral Officer. The 
36 These pressure groups were the Human Rights Association of Swaziland (HUMARAS), the 
Swaziland National Association of Teachers (SNAT) (Swazi Observer, 1988); they also included 
putative political parties like the ... (NNLC), the People's United Democratic Movement (PUDEMO), 
the Swaziland Youth Congress (SWAYOCO), the Swaziland National Front (SNF), and the Swaziland 
United Party. 
37 UNDP (2003: 9). 
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Chief Electoral Officer in turn appoints the rest of the officers. The High Court 
adjudicates in matters relating to elections, although some cases can be taken 
to the Magistrate's Court. 
Elections were conducted again in 1993 under the new legislation, though 
parties remained banned. By this time, however, pressure groups opposed to 
the government had adopted a strategy to boycott the elections and drew a 
large following. As the election was not well monitored, however, it was not 
possible to ascertain how many voters actually stayed away, or what the real 
cause of the low voter turnout was. It is not known whether people responded 
to the call to boycott elections or were generally apathetic. 
In 1998 and 2003, the Swazis again went to the polls, against the same 
backdrop of high levels of apathy and general discontentment (a significant 
number of people wanted the removal of the 1973 decree and the un-banning 
of political parties). The 2003 elections assumed another twist as members of 
pressure groups and self-un-banned political parties took part in the elections 
in a bid to 'fight the system from within', resulting in major divisions within the 
'progressive's' movement. In the end, only a handful of members from these 
formations were elected into Parliament and their influence has been minimal. 
2.5 The Swazi Parliament 
Parliament is important for policy-making processes, as this is where national 
issues are debated and transformed into policy and ultimately law. Swaziland 
has a bicameral Parliament, made up of the House of Assembly and the 
Senate. The House of Assembly consists of fifty-five members elected from 
the various constituencies across the country, and an additional ten members 
appOinted the monarch. These sixty-five members in turn elect to the Senate 
10 persons from outside their ranks, whereas the King appoints an additional 
twenty members.38 The King appoints the Prime Minister from either of these 
two chambers or from outside Parliament. The Prime Minister, in consultation 
38 These rules are set out in the Establishment of Parliament Order 1992. 
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with the King, thereafter selects a Cabinet from the members of both Houses 
of Parliament. 
The King's power to appoint comes from two special sources: the special 
position of the King in Swazi culture, and the pre-requisite in Swaziland for 
him to act as a symbol of authority, legitimacy and unity (Okpaluba et ai, 
1997). Ideally, the purpose of these extra appointments is that other interest 
groups, and particularly minorities, may be granted an opportunity to be 
represented. Presently, though, this is not happening, as the King tends to 
nominate his friends and relatives in an effort to strengthen and reinforce the 
status quo and to reduce opposition in Parliament. 
2.6 The Swazi Government 
The present governance system is underpinned by a combination of the 
parliamentary system inherited from the British and the traditional system 
upheld by the monarchy. These systems have largely shaped the present 
pattern of the political processes, policies and laws. 
The mission statement of the Government of the Kingdom of Swaziland is "to 
provide a climate and infrastructure that progressively maximises the quality 
and security of the people of Swaziland and makes the best use of the 
country's natural and human resources".39 
The King appoints the Prime Minister. With the advice of the Prime Minister, 
he thereafter appoints members of the Cabinet. The King also appoints 
judges, Chief Executive Officers of Ministries and other important officials. 
The Attorney General is an ex officio member of the House of Assembly, and 
thus a civil servant appOinted by the King. Members of the House of 
Assembly elect the Speaker. Clearly, the King as an Executive Monarch 
dominates all aspects of Swazi politics. 
39 Local Government Refonn and Decentralisation Policy Document, 2005: 4. 
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The government of Swaziland has fourteen ministries,4o plus the Prime 
Minister's Office and the Deputy Prime Minister's Office (Hall, quoted in 
Legum, 2004: B) There also exists a Cabinet made up of Cabinet committees 
and other related organs and organisations. 
The major process of transformation of the civil service to increase its 
efficiency, cost effectiveness and productivity took place through the Public 
Sector Management Programme (PSMP). The Swaziland Government 
launched this programme in 1995 with the aim of reforming the public service 
to enhance its capacity and performance. The PSMP has in the meantime 
launched a number of strategic interventions aimed at rationalising the 
operations of the civil service and ensuring fiscal management. 
There is growing concern about the decreased capacity of government to 
deliver services, with its personnel simply lacking the skills they need in all 
sectors of government.41 Although it is important to strengthen sectoral 
capacities, there is a need simultaneously to develop innovative community 
driven interventions that enable government and its key partners to respond in 
a systemic and integrated way to address the human capacity challenges.42 
These piloted interventions, if successful, can be scaled up to feed into 
broader policy formulation. The Southern African Capacity Initiative (SACI) 
has initiated this framework in Swaziland. 
2.7 The Three Spheres of Government 
Being based on the Westminster system, the Swazi government consists of 
the three branches of government, namely the Legislature, the Executive and 
the Judiciary. However, given the current situation in Swaziland, functions in 
these important spheres are limited by the dual nature of the political system 
40 These are: (I) The Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, (2) Economic Planning and 
Development, (3) Education, (4) Enterprise and Employment, (5) Finance, (6) Foreign Affairs and 
Trade, (7) Health and Social Welfare, (8) Home Affairs, (9) Housing and Urban Development, 
(10) Justice and Constitutional Affairs, (II) Natural Resources and Energy, (12) Public Service and 
Information, (13) Public Works and Transport, (14) Tourism, Environment and Communication. 
41 UNDP (2003:64). 
42 Ibid., p64. 
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as a whole.43 This is compounded by the fact that the King has assumed all 
executive, legislative and judiciary powers. 
Oversight of the executive is non-existent. In a representative government 
where politicians have been elected, they are expected to oversee the ways in 
which government implements policy and spends tax revenue. The executive 
is in theory accountable to the legislature. (Murray and Nijzink, 2002: 87). 
With the Constitution being suspended in Swaziland, however, no provision 
for parliamentary accountability exists. The draft National Constitution 2003 
moreover does not alleviate the problem, as the power remains centralised in 
the King. 
The oversight function creates a chain of accountability where voters confer 
authority to MPs in Parliament, which in turn confers authority on the Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, who establish and appoint departments and heads of 
departments. Departments and their heads account to Cabinet and the Prime 
Minister who are accountable to Parliamentarians, who in turn are 
accountable to the voters. 
The chain of responsibility is different in Swaziland where at the end of the 
chain is the head of state in both his capacities as King and Ngwenyama. 
This clearly creates conflicts in which traditionally accorded loyalty and 
allegiance complicates and compromises accountability and transparency. 
Parliamentarians are neither confident of their role nor sure of how to exercise 
oversight. This can be seen from issues irrelevant to the proceedings that 
emerge at question time. In the few instances where parliamentarians 
attempt to question issues of policy, implementation and tax spending, cabinet 
ministers become defensive about what they regard as meddling. 
43 Proceedings of a Conference on Bridging the Political Divide, 21-23 June 2002, Pigg's Peak, 
Swaziland, pAO. 
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Oversight requires practices such as effective question sessions, special 
debates in plenary, committee reports and an annual national budget. The 
Executive in Swaziland closely guides the budget and the budgeting process, 
making it a closed process. The financial year also creates a problem in that 
spending will have started already by the time that members meet to discuss 
the budget, meaning that they are reacting to what has already been decided. 
Consequently, they have complained about merely rubber-stamping the 
budget. 
Whereas the South African Constitution contains specific provisions for the 
relationship between the Executive and the Legislature with regard to issues 
of budgeting (Murray and Nijzink, 2002), the draft Swaziland Constitution has 
none. This is unfortunate because, if the legislature were accorded its legal 
and rightful function of oversight, it would be able to legislate on budgetary 
matters. This would allow voters through their representatives in Parliament 
to make the necessary amendments (Murray and Nijzink, 2002). 
Oversight should relate to human rights. Neither in South Africa, nor in 
Swaziland are the Legislature, oversight, human rights and promotion of the 
Constitution explicitly linked (Murray and Nijzink, 2002). A constitution usually 
states the type of society government may promote. Monitoring of rights 
helps with this (Murray and Nijzink, 2002). 
Giving people the right to enquire into the government's progress in 
implementing programmes makes politicians aware that they have to link 
policies to the broader constitution and obliges them to develop expertise in 
the human rights issues in their portfolios (Murray and Nijzink, 2002). This in 
turn enhances the ability of the state to promote and fulfil its human rights 
obligations. It gives the general public access to parliamentary procedures 
rather than limiting it to NGOs and pressure groups 
(Murray and Nijzink, 2002). 
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2.8 The Role of Civil Society in Democratisation 
In recent decades, scholars have attributed the fall of Eastern Europe and the 
failure of its socialist 'democracies' to the fact that civil society was 
suppressed and that, without a vibrant civil society, real democracy could not 
thrive. This illustrates the confidence that people generally have in the power 
of civil society to influence government. Sachikonye (1995) asserts that the 
growth of civil society has been uneven both within and between countries, 
but that it has lately become more robust, active and organised across the 
world, in the pursuit of the interests of citizens. South Africa, for instance, has 
a fairly organised and effective civil society marked by organisations and 
movements of women, the landless, the labour force, and people living with 
HIV/AIDS. The situation in Swaziland is very different. 
Nonetheless, civil society in Swaziland has a renewed appeal, as citizens 
appear to depend on it to participate actively in non-state institutions, as the 
necessary basis for participation in formal political institutions (Kuper and 
Kuper, 1999: 89). Mamdani (1996) counters the tendency to assume that in 
the democratisation process, political parties and state institutions become the 
sole actors and the guarantors of adequate representation of sections of 
society in the political process. He shows that they are neither, and that other 
entities, such as civil society formations, must contribute towards the process. 
Civil society institutions can and should furthermore play a key role in 
articulating the interests of under-represented sectors of society. In 
Swaziland, then, civil society has the potential to effectively represent the 
concerns of the people, but the political conditions are not conducive to this. 
Even while performing this function, civil society also needs to guard its 
autonomy against the corporatist strategies of the state, especially when it 
receives financial support from it. CSOs need to maintain their independence 
and sovereignty in order to be able to monitor the state for any violations of 
human rights, nepotism and corruption. 
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2.8.1 NGO Contribution to Democracy 
NGOs in Africa unlike their counterparts in Latin America, have not been 
directly involved in politics (Kuper and Kuper, 1999). Like their counterparts in 
sub-Saharan Africa, though, Swazi NGOs have been excluded from power by 
a lack of policy influence and opportunities to participate in higher-level 
decision-making (Michael, 2004: 51). Most African NGO's contribution to the 
promotion of democracy has been through supporting grassroots 
organisations with resources, training and information. During the last 
elections of 2003 in Swaziland, NGOs such as the Leadership Regional 
Network for Southern Africa (LeaRN), Women in Law and Development 
(WLSA) , the Women's Resource Centre (WRC) , World University Services 
(WUS) and Lutsango LwakaNgwane,44 launched the first campaign ever to 
educate the Swazi people and to debate issues of elections and 
constitutionalism. In this way, NGOs have created practical schools of 
democracy from which members of grassroots organisations are able to follow 
democratic practices. (Buturo, undated). 
2.8.2 The History of Civil Society and NGOs in Swaziland 
In this paper, the term civil society refers to those parts of society that fall 
outside of government structures, such as charities, religious organisations, 
professional groups, trade unions, human rights groups. Civil society serves 
as a check against the excesses of government's human rights violations and 
abuse of the rule of law, and monitors applications of constitutional provisions. 
Throughout developing countries, even before their independence from the 
relevant colonial powers, wealthy members of Swazi society tried to relieve 
the suffering of the underprivileged through organisations (Michael, 2005: 5), 
such as the Zondle's Women's Organisation45 and the Malkerns Women's 
Institute in Swaziland. These developed further after Swaziland became 
44 Lutsango LwakaNgwane (which translates to a "women's fortress") is a women's regiment in 
Swaziland named by King Sobhuza II. Its patron is the Queen Mother. 
45 Zondle means "feed yourself'. This is a feeding scheme based in both Manzini and Mbabane 
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independent and broadened their aims to promote socio-economic 
development throughout the country.46 Increasing poverty levels and other 
symptoms of underdevelopment have resulted in a proliferation of NGOs in 
Swaziland to fill in the gaps.47 Over the years, some of these have survived, 
whereas others have been disbanded due to internal and/or external factors. 
A 1912 law in Swaziland stipulates that NGOs will not seek profit. 48 
Although NGOs are not registered under any section of Swaziland's domestic 
statute, their names and badges are protected under a 1969 statute. The 
Draft National Policy on NGOs 2002 (which is not yet law) defines NGOs as 
legally formed autonomous organisations that possess non-profit status and 
whose primary motivation is to improve the well-being of the people. NGOs 
are service driven and serve in diverse ways, but they are all involved in that 
may relate to the development processes that promote social transformation 
and sustainable development. These organisations are established outside 
central government, for a public purpose and are not self-serving in their aims 
and interests. The income they generate and the property they own cannot 
be distributed to members or office bearers, except as reasonable 
compensation for services rendered.49 
The Draft NGO Policy states that NGOs view development in terms of a 
participatory process of capacity building and empowerment of communities 
to improve their socio-economic situation and expand opportunities to make a 
sustainable livelihood. Their activities are carried out through service delivery, 
resource mobilisation, research and innovation, human resource 
development, public information, education and advocacy. 
Many of them have worked in isolation for years, making civil society in 
Swaziland weak and fragmented and effectively compromising its ability to 
influence policy. The 1973 Decree severely undermined the development of a 
46 Mohammed (1992), Therkilden and Semboja (1995), Van Rooyen (2000) and Shurke, cited in 
Michael, 2004: 119. 
47 The Contribution of Civil Society to Democracy and Development in Swaziland, 2003: 6. 
48 The Draft National Policy on NGOs, 2002: 3. 
49 Ibid., p9. 
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vibrant civil society in the country. In fact, the constitutions of most NGOs 
declared that they were apolitical.5o Most organisations consciously had to 
avoid political issues in order to survive. This created problems in addressing 
land disputes in rural areas, which are inherently political because of the 
ultimate involvement of chiefs and often times the king in such matters. The 
high dependency of the sector on external donors or government funding 
worsened this situation (Mzizi, 2002). 
The 1990s saw the emergence of human rights and gender related 
organisations, with some NGOs becoming vocal on these topiCS. More NGOs 
thus joined the fray, resulting in many NGOs integrating lobbying and 
advocacy on human rights and gender issues into their programmes. 51 
Swaziland, unlike South Africa, lacks a strong CSO that can mobilise 
sustained pressure on the government for policy development. Mzizi (2002) 
points to limited civic education and few fora for public debate or criticism of 
the status quo. 52 Although the purpose of CSOs is to promote development, 
their poor organisation, lack of resources and control, means that they are 
weak and lack the capacity to contribute effectively to democracy, 
development and policy (Mzizi, 2002). In order to facilitate the coordination of 
NGO activities, maximise utilisation of resources, and reduce duplication and 
unhealthy competition, NGOs have formed various consortia according to 
their areas of focus. The most important of these are the HIV/AIDS, Gender 
and Food, Security and Development Consortia. 
In terms of the approach of so-called 'welfare pluralism' a relationship existed 
between government and NGOs, where the latter would assist the former in 
delivering new public service programmes to society. Both groups saw 
themselves as working partners in service delivery and resource mobilisation 
in a pattern termed 'welfare pluralism', which was based on consensus and 
contract. Because all the challenges prevailing in the institutional ethic, 
50 The Contribution of Civil Society to Democracy and Development in Swaziland, 2003: 6. 
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however, the relationship between NGOs and government changed. While the 
consensual and contractual relationship of welfare pluralism continued, the 
new approaches inevitably meant differences of policy and practice between 
some NGOs and government.53 
The evolution of NGOs has bred a new kind of NGOs, some of which will 
challenge government directly and others indirectly as the world continues to 
change and meet with new challenges (Ball and Dunn, 1995: 17). NGOs 
have, though, maintained their status and most governments recognise that 
as long as NGOs operate within the law, their activities are legitimate, 
including those that can sometimes be discomforting for the government such 
as civic education (8all and Dunn, 1995). 
However, the growth of the NGO sector and the issue of achieving long-term 
sustainability pose a challenge to NGOs to adjust their administrative and 
logistic approaches to suit the dictates of the ever-changing environment. 
The issue of subvention of NGOs has remained pertinent because of the 
realisation that, in the long term, Swaziland will be put under increasing 
pressure to finance its developmental activities through its own resources 
rather than relying on external donor support. Given this, care must be taken 
to ensure that maintaining the autonomy of NGOs and ensuring that grants, 
subsidies and subventions are available, does not amount to the dumping of 
public funds and the abdication of duty. 
2.8.3 Civil Society's Contribution to Democracy in Swaziland 
As authorities continue to play for time in the constitution-making process, 
Swaziland faces a deteriorating state of governance marked by the 
government's perSistent disregard for the rule of law. Court of Appeal 
judgments were blatantly Houted, and the judiciary was compromised through 
threats and demotion of judges. Lack of fiscal discipline and prioritisation 
showed in the purchase of a R70 million private jet for the king in the midst of 
53 Non-Governmental Organisations: Guidelines for Good Policy and Practice - The Commonwealth 
Foundation, 1995: 15. 
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the drought and the devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic; as a result, the budget 
deficit grew to unprecedented levels. 54 
In 2003, presented with this grave scenario, CSOs for the first time in the 
country's history formed a coalition in order to engage with government. 
Members of this coalition included NGOs, trade unions, businesses and the 
churches. 55 
Through a declaration and a petition, the Coalition called for dialogue with 
government, as well as for a review of the decisions taken concerning court 
judgments and the purchase of the jet. The Coalition also called for the 
speedy finalisation of the Constitution and for Swaziland to entrench the 
separation of powers and guarantee people's freedoms. 56 
The establishment of this Coalition marked a turning point. Although the 
government refused to recognise the Coalition, it could not ignore its 
existence, and so it has been forced to negotiate with it. This formation has 
since strengthened the voice of non-state actors and created broader 
partnerships with business. Although it is still too early to judge its 
effectiveness, ordinary people look to this body to represent their interests in 
government. 57 
2.8.4 Credibility of Civil Society with Government and the People of 
Swaziland 
Relationships between government and civil society organisations are 
complex in Swaziland. Any organisation, for instance, that challenges 
government policy is automatically perceived as the 'enemy' of the state and 
the state's position in turn influences the population. In fact any organisation 
that calls for a Constitutional monarch is viewed as an organisation that 
dislikes the monarch.58 
54 The Contribution of Civil Society to Democracy and Development in Swaziland June, 2003: 9. 
55 Ibid., p.9. 
56 Ibid., p.9. 
57 Ibid., pp.9-1 O. 
58 Ibid., p.lO 
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On a more positive note, the government does collaborate with the different 
CSOs in the country especially on developmental issues, such as agriculture, 
education, health, social welfare and gender. Agricultural NGOs work closely 
with Extension Officers in the rural areas. Educational NGOs such as Fundza 
(meaning 'read' or 'learn') collaborate with teachers, head teachers, the 
National Curriculum Centre and National Libraries. The Ministry of Health and 
Social Welfare through its Rural Health Motivators collaborates with NGOs 
working on HIV/AIDS and other health issues. Save the Children and other 
welfare organisations work together with officials from the Social Welfare 
ministry. The formation of the Gender Consortium has made it easier for the 
Gender Unit under the Ministry of Home Affairs to coordinate gender issues in 
Swaziland. These good working relationships promote capacity building, skills 
transfer and enhancement by sharing and dissemination information between 
government and NGOs. 
Although there is no legal framework that governs operations of NGOs in the 
country, they have been able to work cordially with government. NGOs, for 
example, work together with government in compiling progress reports on 
specific Conventions (Michael, 2004), e.g. the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child at international level and the SADC Gender and Development (GAD) 
Declaration at regional level. Accessing government funds, however, depends 
on the relationship forged between the government Ministry and a particular 
NGO. 
Support is not only monetary but takes other forms too (Michael, 2004) such 
as the provision of infrastructure, for instance the housing of Fundza and 
SHAPE (Schools HIV and AIDS Programme and Education) at the Ministry of 
Education. This reduces rent and utility costs and furthermore impresses the 
donor community, who view this as a sign of government's commitment to 
advancing that sector. The WRC Gender Desk cooperates commendably 
with the government's own Gender Unit in co-funding and co-facilitating 
activities. Unfortunately, though, there are too few such cases of 
cooperation, and there is definitely room for improvement. 
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Sometimes the government distributes funds from donor agencies to various 
NGOs. International donor agencies have recently allocated funds to NGOs 
through government, a trend that is not necessarily workable in practice 
(Michael, 2004: 123). The UNDP, for example, requires NGOs to contact the 
government's Gender Unit in order to access their Gender and Human Rights 
funds. 
2.9 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the historical and socio-political context within 
which Swaziland's public policy is made, highlighting the long-standing 
problem of duality that haunts Swaziland's political arena. It illustrated how 
duality is crosscutting especially in the system of governance, and explored its 
implications for policy. The absence of a Constitution has proved a major 
drawback to promoting citizen participation in national and other issues. 
The Swazi Electoral System was examined in light of the importance of 
elections as a form of citizen participation in electing representative to present 
their concerns through policy and legislation in parliament. The above section 
also explored state institutions, such as Parliament and its relationship with 
the government, especially insofar as Parliament lacks power and oversight. 
The relationship between the state and civil society is a vital one; particular 
attention was thus paid to the role of civil society in promoting democracy and 
policy formulation. The chapter ended by looking at the history of NGOs in 
Swaziland and their contribution to democracy and policymaking. Although 
NGOs do have some space to conduct their work of influencing government's 
poliCies, there is room for improvement, particularly with regard to policy 
formulation. 
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CHAPTER 3: POLICY MAKING PROCESSES IN SWAZILAND 
3.1 Introduction 
As a background to the policy-making process, this section of the study firstly 
describes the sources of policies and some of the institutions responsible for 
policy making. It goes on to explore in detail the initiation of a policy as an 
issue identified by a community. Swaziland does not have a long history of 
policy formulation and implementation. The study will show how Swaziland 
has formulated various policies, most of which have however not been 
adopted. 
This chapter shows the absence of a mechanism that enables NGOs to 
participate in the policy-making processes of the country. The Coordinating 
Assembly of NGOs (CANGO) has the role of coordinating and facilitating 
participation of NGOs in these processes. A detailed narrative of the origins 
and functions of CANGO are presented here. 
The chapter also explores current approaches and new trends in policy 
formulation in the country. As the focus of this study is on the participation of 
NGOs in policymaking, this chapter will examine both the theory and practice 
of such participation. It further investigates the existing relationship between 
NGOs and the Executive. Finally, the contribution of the donor community, 
which also influences policy, is highlighted. 
3.2 Sources of Policy in Swaziland 
Important documents to consider in terms of policy making are: 
• the National Development Strategy (NOS) as the basis of government's 
long-term strategy, from which most policies are drawn, including the 
two policies specifically discussed herein, viz SME Policy 2004 and the 
Decentralisation Policy 2005; 
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• the Economic and Social Reform Agenda (ESRA), a short-term rollout 
plan of government that is also drawn from the NDS; 
• Development plans of the different ministries in the form of three-year 
rollout plans, ideally to be complemented by the Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework (MTEF) 
• The Draft National Constitution is vital in terms of setting out 
government and governance structures and spelling out the importance 
of the separation of powers; it also addresses other political and 
economic policy issues; 
• The National Budget shows government's policy priorities by the 
amounts allocated to the different ministries and departments; 
• Acts of Law, such as the Public Enterprise Monetary Act in the case of 
SME regulation. 
3.2.1 The Public Policy Coordinating Unit (PPCU) 
The government document that established the Public Policy Coordination 
Unit (PPCU) states that the creation of this unit was precipitated by the plunge 
in economic performance in the early 1990s. The budget went heavily into 
deficit and recurrent expenditures began to grow at a rate that could not be 
sustained. Other factors, including the rapid changes in the political and 
economic situation in the SADC region and the regional recession, 
destabilised both the economy and future development. In 1997, the 
government established the PPCU to improve the quality of policy advice 
available to Cabinet through the Office of the Prime Minister. The Unit was 
created to strengthen the Cabinet Secretariat. The Cabinet Secretariat is a 
small unit, responsible for the provision of policy advice, administration of 
Cabinet business, and monitoring the implementation of Cabinet decisions. 
3.2.2 TraCing the Policy-Making Process in Swaziland 
There are two ways of processing a policy. One way is through private 
means, which is a process that operates outside of government and requires 
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funding from the movers. This type of bill is normally initiated by NGOs, for 
example in instances, of Child Abuse or Sexual Offences. The second 
method of processing policies may come from the requirements of 
international and regional organisations, such as the AU, the Economic 
Commission of Africa (ECA) or SADC. 
Like most countries in the world, in Swaziland the government has the primary 
responsibility for formulating policy, and so initiates most policy documents. 
Depending on the so-called mover, other stakeholders beyond government 
may be involved. 
A simplified model of policy development might run as follows: A group of 
people at community level identify an issue of critical concern to them, such 
as the high incidence of rape. This issue is then taken up with the Member of 
Parliament (MP) who has two options: The MP could take the matter directly 
to Parliament and present it in a question and answer session for the relevant 
minister (the Minister of Justice in this case) to explain the position on the 
issue or to explore the possibility of emerging with a policy or law. 
Alternatively, the MP could directly approach the minister in the relevant office 
and request that he or she take up the issue at cabinet level. T~lis gives the 
minister the opportunity to bring bureaucrats and technicians to the table to 
address the topic. The ministry concerned will approach the Attorney 
General's (AG) Chambers with a brief or instruction on the desired policy. 
Following this, conferences will be held between the AG's office, the 
instructing ministry and any other interested parties for clarification. The AG's 
office will then draft the policy, and return it to the instructing ministry. 
Thereafter, the instructing ministry sends the draft to Cabinet. If it is not 
approved, it is returned to the AG's office for amendments. From there it is 
returned to the instructing ministry to check the requested amendments, 
where after it is again returned to Cabinet. At the end of this process, if 
Cabinet approves of the amended Draft, it becomes policy. However in the 
instance of a bill, it will be gazetted as a bill for thirty days, unless there is an 
element of urgency, in which case it will take a shorter period. 
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The bill is then taken to Parliament for debate in both houses (viz. the House 
of Assembly, and the Senate), with each incorporating their changes. 
However, if there are disagreements (as happened recently, for instance, 
during a debate on the equality clause in the Constitution and the provision on 
religion), a joint sitting of both houses is arranged. In the absence of any such 
disagreement, however, the Bill is then sent to the King for assent. However, 
if the King has any differing views, a joint sitting of both houses and the King 
will be arranged to address specific problem sections before it is signed. 
The Speaker of Parliament, the President and the AG all have to write 
certificates that certify the changes that have been made to the draft. The 
document is then sent back to the AG, who incorporates these changes. The 
instructing ministry checks it once more, before returning it to the AG. After 
the King has signed the document, it is published as an Act of Parliament.59 
3.2.3 Processing a Policy in Swaziland 
There are three ways of involvement in processing a policy in Swaziland. The 
first option is for a ministry to involve other government ministries working in 
the relevant sector. In the case of SME Policies, the following procedure might 
be followed. The Ministry of Enterprise and Employment (MEE), for example, 
would involve ministries dealing with income generation projects, credit, 
savings and loans. The ministry might, for instance, identify fourteen 
government ministries who all deal with certain aspects of SMEs. If this 
approach is used, an invitation would then be extended to the rest of civil 
society affected by the issue. 
The second option is for the coordinating ministry to create sectors based on 
the different areas of concern within the broader issue concerned. In the 
process of formulating the Population Policy, for example, sectors such as 
Gender, Disabled, Environment, Youth, Agriculture and Health were 
59 Information on the policy formulation process was obtained through an interview on 26 November 
2004 with Senior Parliamentary Counsel -AG's Office: Mr. Sabelo Matsebula at the AG's offices in 
Mbabane. 
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established. Both the line ministries and other stakeholders coordinated these 
sectors jointly. The Director of Gender in the Gender Unit under the Ministry 
of Home Affairs, for instance, coordinated the Gender sector. The National 
Council on Population and Development Committee was then created to 
screen the contributions made by the different sectors to test their validity. 
The third option of processing a policy is to secure the services of a consultant 
to write the policy. The Gender policy, which was formulated in 2000, was 
formulated in this manner. 
In most instances, the inclination is for a ministry to consult related ministries 
and departments in that area to work with in formulating a policy. Participation 
is then extended to the rest of civil society or stakeholders, especially NGOs. 
For instance, if the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare needs to improve the 
HIV/AIDS Policy, it would consult the ministries of Agriculture, Education, 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs. NGOs such as FLAS60 , SWAGAA61, 
SAS062 TASC)63 and Baphalali Red Cross would also become involved. 
Similarly, the Ministry of Education in promoting the Policy on Libraries, will 
initially engage the National Curriculum Centre and Swaziland National 
Association of Libraries. Thereafter, it will approach organisations, such as 
the Swaziland Reading, Fundza and SHAPE. 
However, the tendency is to involve specific ministries and departments more 
than other stakeholders. Primarily, this is because communication within 
ministries and line departments is much better, which makes it easier for them 
to communicate amongst themselves, than with 'outside' stakeholders. 
There also seems to be a tendency to value communication and involvement 
of departments within a ministry. The involvement of other ministries and 
stakeholders is more a formality than because much value is attached to their 
contributions and inputs. When asked about other NGOs that did not 
60 Family Life Association of Swaziland 
61 Swaziland Action Group Against Abuse 
62 Swaziland AIDS Support Organisation 
63 The infonnation centre on AIDS Support and Counseling 
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participate in the SME Policy-making process, although they could 
theoretically have been involved, an official from the SME Unit said that 'the 
lack of participation of those organisations did not mean that the documents 
had any lesser value'. 
Two factors make it difficult for an issue to be addressed in policy. One is that 
the steps within the process are not clearly set out. The second is to do with 
power struggles; powerful people have a stronger voice than community 
members have, and thus tend to hijack successful issues in order to get credit 
for them. 
3.2.4 Trends in the Development of Public Policy in Swaziland 
Although Swaziland gained its independence in 1968, minimal work has been 
conducted around the development of policy. It was not until 1997 that 
government was spurred into establishing the PPCU to coordinate policy 
formulation. Prior to this, policy formulation occurred through the ministries. 
Like the drafting of the most recent policies, the establishment of the PPCU is 
also guided by the NOS. In line with the vision of the NOS, the Unit 
acknowledges that public policy is the guide for government action, which 
allows the attainment of societal goals, embodying the future direction of 
government and its ultimate aims. As a coordinating unit, it states that all 
public policy in Swaziland should be in line with the sectoral strategies and 
goals of the NOS, as these strategies are intended to enable the country to 
achieve Vision 2022 of the NOS.54 
At a forum held for Principal Secretaries in June 2002, a public policy template 
was drafted and circulated to serve as a guide for ministries when drafting 
public policy documents. 55 This template also serves as a guide for action to 
ensure that all the necessary information is included in a document and that 
64 Draft copy of Public Policy and Cabinet Papers; A Guide for Ministries, 2004: I. 
65 Information on the PPCU was also secured from an interview with the Director, Mr. Vincent 
Matsebula on 29 November 2004 at the PPCU offices in Mbabane. 
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all the structures are clearly set out. It is hoped that the use of a standard 
format for drafting public policy will result in greater efficiency.66 
The main function of the PPCU, therefore, is to coordinate and harmonise the 
formulation of policy by the different ministries and thus to reduce duplication 
between ministries, maximise the use of resources and encourage 
cooperation between ministries in terms of policy formulation activities. 
A further benefit of a standard format for public policy documents is that it 
provides a guide to the content and structure of a policy document for civil 
servants who are responsible for developing and managing public policy. 
Because portfolios and ministries do overlap in practice, though, collaborative 
policy formulation processes are necessary to facilitate cooperation. They will 
also result in policies that are structurally similar and therefore more likely to 
be implemented uniformly by civil servants throughout all levels of 
government. Lastly, policy review will be swifter if those reviewing the 
document are familiar with the standard format expected by government. 
Since independence, Swaziland has drafted and adopted a number of 
policies, such as the Population Policy and the National Irrigation Policy, but it 
does not have a strong record with regard to the actual adoption or 
implementation of policies; a large number remain in draft form.67 Policies 
outline visions, ideal outcomes, with clear identification of sectoral 
responsibilities, through specific goals and objectives. A clear legal 
framework with action plans permits the effective implementation of such 
policies. Once they have been adopted and implemented, the policies will also 
facilitate adherence to human rights. The long delayed action in adopting 
policies that have already been drafted, results in policies that are outdated 
when they are finally adopted. This is further exacerbated by the long delays 
in implementation of action plans and programmes.68 
66 Draft copy of Public Policy and Cabinet Papers; A Guide for Ministries, 2004: 2. 
67 Conunon Country Assessment of Swaziland: Working Draft, 20 October 2004, United Nations 
Country Team, p.l8. 
68 Conunon Country Assessment of Swaziland: Working Draft, 20 October 2004, United Nations 
Country Team, p.18. 
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3.2.5 The Swaziland Policy Framework 
The inability of the government to formalise policies and translate them into 
action plans and programmes is clearly illustrated in this Table of outstanding 
policies awaiting adoption.69 
Policy Purpose Date Draft 
Completed 
The National Policy on To provide policy guidelines to ensure 2003 
Children, including that appropriate interventions are put in 
Orphaned and Vulnerable place to adequately care for and protect 
Children children 
Land Policy To provide guidance on land tenure 1999 
including the usage of Swazi National 
Land to include a possible lease 
agreement 
National Disaster Policy To coordinate all disaster related actives 1999 
in the country, particularly mitigating 
against drought 
Draft NGO Policy To guide operation of NGOs 2002 
Health and Social Welfare To address health and social welfare 2001 
Policy issues 
i National Gender Policy To eliminate existing gender 2001 
discrepancies with sectoral policy 
guidelines 
Agriculture Policy To give guidance to priorities in 2004 
agricultural interventions 
Reproductive Health To provide guidelines for implementation 2002 
Policy of sexual and reproductive health 
activities 
National Draft Irrigation To provide direction in the irrigation sub- 2005 
Policy sector 
Resettlement Policy To establish a durable, practical and 
1
2003 
69 Common Country Assessment of Swaziland: Working Draft, 20 October 2004, United Nations 
Country Team, p.18. 
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! participatory framework for planning and I 
I sustainable management of land 
Local Government Reform. To initiate the decentralisation process of 2005 I 
and Decentralisation local government by harmonizing the dual 
. Policy system of governance 
I 
United Nations Country Team: Common Country Assessment of 
Swaziland: Working Draft (2004:18). 
3.2.6 The Contribution of the International Community to Policy Making 
in Swaziland 
In Swaziland, the international community is confined to a few embassies and 
various UN agencies. 70Some donor agencies have closed shop and 
relocated to other countries because of the alleged poor human rights record 
of Swaziland. Organisations such as the Canada Fund and the British 
Council have also left the country. On several occasions, the European Union 
(EU) has threatened to withhold financial assistance to Swaziland, if it does 
not ratify some of the important international instruments, such as the 
Convention to Eradicate all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) 
(which was finally furtively ratified mid-2004). The EU also used to contribute 
towards the country's constitution-making process, but ultimately ceased 
doing so, noting that it was a never-ending process. 
The few agencies remaining in the country do not directly participate in the 
policy-making process, although they do contribute in different ways. As the 
international and donor agencies strive to maintain civil diplomatic 
relationships with the government, they do not want to be seen as 
antagonising the state, yet they can play an important role in the country. 
The Press and Public Affairs Officer at the British High Commission said that 
the Commission has compiled country assessment reports that could 
contribute towards policy formulation, but this kind of information is 
embargoed.71 The EU supports three different programmes in the African, 
Caribbean and Pacific countries including Swaziland. One of the programmes 
70 UNFP A, UNDP and USAlDS 
71 Interview held on 26 November 2004 at the British High Commission offices in Mbabane 
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is on Good Governance, but this portfolio is handled at the head office 
overseas therefore issues of governance are not addressed locally. A 
representative of the EU, which financed the formulation of the SME policy, 
during an interview discussed how limited their role is with regard to policy 
formulation. 72 
Although the Commonwealth has no offices in Swaziland, it has played a vital 
role in the politics of the country. In 2003, it was called in to observe the 
elections, which it did, and to compile a report in that regard. Faced with the 
continuous disregard of the rule of law in Swaziland and the still pending 
constitution-making process, the Commonwealth was again called upon to 
scrutinise the Constitution. This was initiated through the International Bar 
Association (IBA), which compiled a report with specific recommendations to 
the government of Swaziland. 
Like other agencies, the American Embassy has not directly participated in 
the policy formulation process in Swaziland, but it has made no secret of its 
opinion that the country should democratise and protect people's rights. On 
many occasions, the American Embassy has sponsored workshops and 
conferences on human rights. It has also censured government for flouting 
court judgments and generally disregarding the rule of law. 
The UNDP has contributed towards policy making, especially since 2000 
onwards, after having changed its focus to Upstream Policy Advisory 
Services.73 Financial and technical contributions have varied from economic 
development to human rights and good governance. 
• The UNDP has contributed towards the formulation of the NDS. 
• The UNDP has played a vital role in the codification of Swazi Law and 
Custom; its objective was to create certainty and reduce conflict within 
the dual legal system and system of governance. 
72 lnterview held on 26 November 2004 at the EU offices in Mbabane 
73 This emerged from an interview with the UNDP Assistant Resident Representative on 1 February 
2005 at the UNDP offices in Mbabane. 
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• The Gender Policy initiative that started in 2000 obtained UNDP 
funding and technical support. 
• The UNDP and the FAO supported the formulation of the Agriculture 
Policy. 
• The HIV/AIDS Policy attracted the support of the UNDP. 
• The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), a country team 
member, supported the Population Policy. 
• The UNDP contributes through a forum called the Swaziland Human 
Development Forum drawn from a wide range of institutions.74 This 
Forum, formed in 2000, presents an opportunity to debate, share and 
disseminate information on current policy issues. 
• The UNDP office has provided both financial and technical support for 
the Decentralisation Policy 2005. 
• The UNDP has also contributed towards the second phase of the 
constitution-making process. The resulting Draft Constitution will have 
a great influence on steering policy in Swaziland. 
The UNDP also collaborates with the rest of the UN Country Team towards 
policy. An officer from the United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) described 
how UNICEF contributes towards directing policy through the so-called 
Common Country Assessments. Other ways of contributing are usually 
through National Action Plans such as the one for 2001. UNICEF further 
contributes through strategies mentioned in documents like the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Plan. Relevant international instruments entered into by 
Swaziland also receive support from UNICEF, which takes them up at policy 
level. Lastly, UNICEF supports the development of guidelines for Protocols to 
which Swaziland is party. 
The UNICEF officer mentioned flaws in policy making, noting the weaknesses 
existing in institutional arrangements and management. She stated that there 
was a lack of capacity to strengthen these institutional arrangements. Further, 
74 These include the following: The Law Society of Swaziland, CANGO, SNA T, University of 
Swaziland (UNISWA), Federation of Swaziland Employers, Trade Unions, Swaziland Medical and 
Dental Association, Swaziland Federation of Labour, National Poverty Reduction Task Force. 
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there is a lack of information and what information there is, tends to be 
fragmented. The lack of a database creates problems, and the centre of 
government is generally weak. 
3.3 NGO's Relationship with the Executive 
The ideal relationship between NGOs and the Executive is described in the 
Draft National Policy on NGOs 2002. This addresses important issues, such 
as the unstructured system of subventions to NGOs, and the lack of policy 
guidelines, reporting, monitoring and evaluation reqUirements, which lead to 
mistrust between government and NGOS.75 The draft policy identifies the 
problem of defining an NGO, and sets out the proper guidelines necessary for 
governing registration and regulation of NGOs. This has resulted in a loss of 
credibility of the NGO sector among the public and a lack of official recognition 
by government. The absence of a formal relationship between NGOs and 
government has also meant that there is no official mechanism in terms of 
which NGOs and government can communicate with each other.76 
75 Draft National Policy on NGOs, 2002: 4. 
16 Ibid., p5. 
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Diagram 5: NGO's Relationship with the Executive 
Ministry of 
Education 
Fundza 
SHAPE 
Sebenta 
WUS 
Acronyms: 
ACAT 
BWAS 
FLAS 
LDS 
LULOTE 
TASC 
SASO 
SHAPE 
WRC 
WUS 
Glossary: 
Emanti Esive 
Fundza 
Imbita 
Sebenta 
Yonge Nawe 
Ministry of 
Enterprise 
& Employment 
Imbita 
WRC 
LULOTE 
BWAS 
Africa Cooperative Action Trust 
Ministry of 
Agriculture 
ACAT 
Emanti Esive 
Yonge Nawe 
LDS 
Business Women's Association of Swaziland 
Family Life Association of Swaziland 
Lutheran Development Services 
Luhlelo Lolunotsisa Temabhizinisi 
The AIDS information and Support Centre 
Swaziland AIDS Support Organisation 
Schools HIV and AIDS Programme and Education 
Women's Resource Centre 
World University Services 
national water services 
read or learn (depending on context used) 
pot 
work 
you can conserve it too 
Ministry of 
Health 
FLAS 
TASC 
SASO 
Red Cross 
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3.4 The Role of CANGO in facilitating NGO Participation in Policy 
Making 
The Coordinating Assembly of NGOs (CANGO) is the umbrella body of NGOs 
in Swaziland. It was originally founded in 1983 as a coordinating secretariat 
for NGOs in the promotion of primary health care. It had been established in 
response to an appeal from the Ministry of Health for better coordination of 
Primary Health Care activities, in pursuit of the universal goal of Health for All 
by the year 2000. 
To enable it to encompass all development NGOs, its Constitution was 
amended in 1987, making it a bona fide national umbrella body for all NGOs. 
CANGO currently has a paid-up membership of fifty-four and another almost 
twenty non-paying adherents. With the increased demands by member 
NGOs, its tasks have also grown. 
The Annual General Meeting (AGM) is the highest policy-making body of 
CANGO. The AGM elects the governing board, drawn 'from the NGO 
membership, on a rotational basis. The Board provides oversight for the 
Secretariat. A Director with a team of seven staff members heads the 
Secretariat. The Secretariat is based in Mbabane, the capital city of 
Swaziland. The organisation receives its main institutional support from donor 
agencies, member subscriptions and management of projects. DFID and the 
Bristol Myers Squib Foundation currently fund the organisation. It also 
generates its own income through project management, rental of property and 
services to members. 77 
The vision of CANGO is the "People of Swaziland taking charge of their lives 
in an environment devoid of poverty, disease, discrimination and socio-
economic instability". The mission statement states that: 
77 Infonnation sourced from responses in a questionnaire electronically administered to and received 
from the Director of CAN GO on 28 February 2005. 
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• "CAN GO seeks to be a common NGO voice and resource for serving 
the people of Swaziland and representing the concerns of the poor, 
disadvantaged, and marginalised. 
• CANGO endeavours to be tolerant of diverse views, to be transparent 
and accountable to CANGO stakeholders, including communities, in 
promoting social justice for all." 
The objectives of CANGO are: 
• To provide a forum to facilitate capacity building and dialogue for 
identifying issues of concern affecting the poor, disadvantaged, 
marginalised and the NGO sector, and for exploring the approaches 
and means for addressing these issues. 
• To encourage and promote a culture of tolerance, transparency and 
accountability in accordance with internationally accepted protocols on 
human rights and the dignity of humankind. 
• To maintain a formal consultative body that will endeavour to promote 
member organisations' interests and mandates. 
• To serve as a facility for receiving, processing and sharing information 
of benefit to CANGO stakeholders, including communities. 
• To engage, advocate and lobby decision makers, government and 
cooperating partners for the concerns of its constituencies. 
Key programmes include the Umchumanisi or Civil Society Support Project, 
an initiative to influence a pro-poor policy environment in the country and to 
foster accountability of service providers to the poor. This is in recognition 
that poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon and therefore requires the 
adoption of a multi-pronged strategy. Through poverty dialogues, research, 
electronic and print media, the organisation endeavours to ensure that the 
voices of the poor inform policy. 
Through NGO networking, organisations are classified into various consortia, 
which make it more manageable for CANGO to facilitate coordination of NGO 
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activities. Networking enhances exchange of relevant information, experience 
and, to some extent, of the meagre available resources. 
Members have access to the onsite CANGO library. CANGO monitors and 
evaluates projects, promotes organisational development and information 
dissemination. More importantly, CANGO acts as a conduit for disbursing 
funds to members on behalf of donors and coordinates projects under the 
auspices of the consortia. The organisation influences public policy by 
representing NGOs in various fora involved in policy formulation. By forming 
partnerships with regional and international organisations, links are created to 
advance the course for member NGOs. 
CANGO raised the profile of gender issues within NGOs and government and 
established a gender desk, which was later transferred to the Ministry of 
Home Affairs. CANGO has played a key role in sensitising civil society, the 
poor, government and the private sector on the growing poverty in the 
country. For these reasons, it has credibility with both government and 
donors. 
Recruiting and maintaining skilled personnel is one of the challenges faced by 
CANGO in the face of shrinking funding destined for Swaziland. The lack of 
legislation hampers progress, as does the lack of research capacity. Lack of 
capacity of civil society to influence the policy environment and the lack of 
capacity to analyse the dimensions of poverty also remain challenges to the 
organisation. 
CANGO is expected to articulate and attend to the aspirations and issues of 
individual members at the same time as interpreting government policy. The 
organisation .is also mandated. to provide a collective voice in terms of public 
engagement on policy issues, to build the capacity of affiliates to deliver 
quality services, and to engage policy makers on issues affecting 
beneficiaries. In 2001, CANGO adopted a strategic shift to address poverty 
alleviation. This placed it in a better position to extend an invitation to 
member NGOs to participate in the SME Policy-making process. 
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The MEE, in a bid to involve all stakeholders, requested GANGO to invite 
NGOs in the SME policy-making process. The Director of GANGO said that 
in the absence of an enabling instrument for participating in the process, 
selection was premised on the specialty of NGOs. Thus, the NGOs identified 
were the Business Women's Association of Swaziland (BWAS), Women's 
Resource Centre (WRC), Luhlelo Lolunotsisa Temabhizinisi (LULOTE): the 
Business Management Enterprise Programme (BMEP) and Imbita Swaziland 
Women's Finance Trust. 
3.5 Conclusion 
There are various sources of policy in Swaziland. Government is the main 
source of policy formulation. The PPGU, for instance, has been established 
to coordinate policy making in the country; however, it needs much 
strengthening. Swaziland has no enabling instrument for NGOs to participate 
in policy-making processes. Nonetheless NGOs and government have a 
cordial working relationship, which extends to policy formulation. NGOs only 
participate in policy formulation when invited by government to do so. 
CANGO plays two important roles in policy participation. Firstly, it represents 
NGOs in policy-making processes and, secondly, it facilitates the direct 
participation of NGOs in policy formulation. This critical role needs to be 
strengthened and improved by, inter alia, adopting the Draft NGO Policy. This 
policy will create an enabling instrument and present clear communication 
channels with government. The international community contributes towards 
policy formulation through research and programmes. 
Tremendous work remains to be done around policy issues and policy 
formulation in Swaziland. The greatest challenge is adoption of policies and 
translating them into practical programmes for implementation so that they 
can actually benefit the people for whom they were formulated. 
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CHAPTER 4: PARTICIPATION OF NGOs IN THE DRAFT 
SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES (SME) POLICY 2004: A 
CASE STUDY 
4.1 Introduction 
This section presents the policy-making process in Swaziland through an 
exploration of group theories and interest groups that illustrates which ones 
are relevant to Swaziland and which ones specifically illuminate the recently 
formulated SME policy. Various stakeholders participated in the formulation 
of this policy. The chapter presents donor practices and attitudes to SMEs. It 
focuses on the formulation of the SME Policy with special attention on 
participation of NGOs. The coordinating role of CANGO in this policy-making 
process will be examined. A framework on participation that has been 
developed by the GTZ will be used in this chapter to ascertain the extent to 
which NGOs have effectively participated in the SME policy formulation 
process. Group theories will be used as a tool for analysing participation of 
interest groups in policy-marking processes. 
The idea of participation here is linked to group theories and interest groups 
as they participate in policy formulation. This chapter looks at how interest 
groups such as NGOs influence the political agenda. 
In order to ascertain the extent to which NGOs in Swaziland participate in the 
policy-making process a case study was conducted. A detailed presentation 
of the study is made here pointing to the tensions and contradictions involved 
in a policy-making process. 
4.2 Group Theories 
The idea of participation should be understood within a conceptual framework 
guided by a theory. Participation means being involved in an activity by way 
of making a contribution or providing input that will be taken into consideration 
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in the end product of the activity. Public participation, therefore, is the 
involvement of citizens in searching for information about how decisions 
related to public issues are taken. In this case, participation would mean their 
involvement in the policy-making process by way of making contributions to 
be taken into consideration when a policy is ultimately formulated and 
adopted. 
Cvetkovich and Earle (1994: 164) as quoted in Venter (2001) describe various 
forms of participation, such as petitioning, surveys, and peaceful and violent 
protests as forms of direct action. They mention a limitation of public 
participation, which is that the mere act of participation normally satisfies 
people and makes them believe that justice has been done. In this sense, 
people are given a 'voice' and they have an opportunity to express their 
opinions on matters that affect them. Referring to Sampson, Cvetkovich and 
Earle (1994: 174) argue that the problem with this 'accommodative voice' is 
that power relations are left unchanged. 
In Swaziland, people are able to express their views, although they are 
nonetheless disregarded because those in power still have the last word. In 
fact, those in power have continued to use this approach for many years, so 
that their domination is not manifested in extreme violence and deaths, which 
would attract the outrage of the international community. 
The key to public satisfaction is the giving of a 'transformational voice', which 
enables people to affect outcomes as well as to express opinions Cvetkovich 
and Earle (1994: 174). The type of voice that people have should make 
leaders sit up and listen and effect change. Civil society's aim is to have such 
a powerful and effective 'transformational voice'. 
The importance of meaningful public participation also comes to the fore in 
Venter (2001) citing Manzer's (1984: 577) distinction between policy 
rationality and substantive rationality. In the former, policies are assessed 
using the criteria of effectiveness and efficiency, while the latter entails a 
strong focus on both legitimacy and responsiveness to questions of justice. 
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Manzer (1984: 578) stresses the importance of both criteria for the evaluation 
of policy. 
4.2.1 Interest Groups 
Interest groups provide a mechanism for people to participate in political 
processes. There is strength in numbers; therefore, acting in a group with 
common goals around one or more issues reaps more benefits than does 
acting individually. 
Elitism, Pluralism, Marxism and Corporatism are different theoretical 
approaches to how the state relates to other important actors in the policy-
making processes. Elitists stress the power exercised by a small number of 
organised societal interests and the ability they have to achieve their goals. 
Anderson (1997: 19), using Dye and Zeigler's "irony of democracy", briefly 
summarises the key principles of elite theory thus: society is divided into elite 
classes drawn from the higher socio-economic ranks that have power - and 
the masses that are excluded from power. The elite have relative consensus 
on the values, which they society to be guided by, and public policy reflects 
this consensus. Elitists do not consider the demands of the masses, which 
are viewed as relatively apathetic and powerless. Because of the elite's stake 
in retaining the status quo, policy changes are generally incremental rather 
than dramatic. 
The Elitist approach contrasts with the Pluralist approach by maintaining that 
political power is concentrated in the hands of the minority of the population. 
Swaziland can be described as elitist because the power is concentrated in 
the Dlamini clan or aristocracy and those they choose to be part of this 
privileged group. 
The Pluralist approach acknowledges that various groups in society have 
different levels of power, and that power is fragmented and diffused 
(Ham and Hill, 1984). Despite such power inequalities, no group is completely 
powerless; money, expertise, professionalism and information are widely 
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distributed, so that no one source is dominant. They state that what a group 
achieves depends on its resources and "decibel rating". The emphasis here 
is on the constraints placed on the state by a wide range of groups and on the 
fact that public policy is largely a reflection of the preferences of these groups, 
NGOs included. 
Marxists point to the influence of economic interests on political action and 
see the state as an important means of maintaining the dominance of 
particular social classes. The Marxist view is that those who own the means 
of production will have the most power and will therefore have particular 
influence on the state to the extent that, in the Communist Manifesto, it is 
stated "The Executive of the modern day state is but a committee for 
managing the affairs of the whole bourgeoisie". It only serves the interests of 
the bourgeoisie and as such acts as an 'instrument' for this dominant class. 
Corporatism, in contrast, is a system in which the state allies itself with the 
interests of powerful private and public groups. In Ham and Hill, (1984) 
Middlemass states that the intention of this group is to include major interest 
groups in the governing process, rather than subordinating them. He says the 
effect of such incorporation is to maintain harmony and avoid conflict by 
permitting these groups to share power. As such, corporatist political 
structures function mainly in relation to economic policy making and not to 
other areas of state activity. The classical case is that of South Africa with its 
tripartite alliance between the South African Communist Party (SACP), the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the African National 
Congress (ANC). This relationship extends to the business community, 
including the National Economic Development and Labour Council, the South 
African Chamber of Business and the National African Chamber of 
Commerce. This, though, does not mean that any economic class or group 
controls the state; rather, it plays an independent role in its relationship with 
labour and capital. 
On another note, Corporatist bargains draw on the knowledge and resources 
of social institutions rather than setting them against each other. An example 
is the incorporation of recognised NGOs such as the Institute for Democracy 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
85 
in South Africa (IDASA) and the Electoral Institute of South Africa (EISA) for 
research, consultation and implementation of government policy. 
Interest groups are important for a healthy democracy. By its very meaning, 
an 'interest' group represents the wishes of a segment of the people, to which 
government ought to respond. Interest groups facilitate participation and thus 
form links between citizens and government in democratic states. Although 
they are also known as pressure groups, their primary function is to promote 
given interests as fundamental to their existence as opposed to simply putting 
pressure on government (Venter. 2001: 299). 
In Venter (2001), Almond and Powell (1996: 75-79) classify interest groups 
into four types: associational, institutional, non-associational and anomic 
interest groups. NGOs can be categorised as associational interest groups. 
The most common strategy used by interest groups to influence policy is 
through lobbying. Lobbying comprises the "stimulation and transmission of a 
communication, by someone other than a citizen acting on her or ~Iis own 
behalf directed to a governmental decision-maker with the hope of influencing 
her or his decision" (Milbrath, 1968: 442). 
In addition to being lobbied directly, government can also be lobbied indirectly 
through mass media and public opinion. Lobbying can also be directed at the 
executive and the legislative levels. Lobbyists choose whom to target 
depending on their own legitimacy, the demand made and the person they 
think would be most cooperative (Venter, 2001). The stage reached in the 
decision process and the form of government or state, are also important 
factors. 
According to Etzioni (1982: 53-55 as quoted in Venter (2001), although 
interest groups are vital in a modern democracy, they can both promote and 
obstruct democracy. Interest groups provide a major source of mediation 
between government and the individual; they create opportunities for 
participation; they educate government by passing on information, facts and 
opinions for policy formulation; they act as important checks on the power of 
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the state, and they stabilise society by providing citizens with a 'safety valve'. 
Nonetheless, they can be a threat to democracy if they are more concerned 
with their own vested interests. Rich influential groups with links to political 
parties thus threaten democratic principles. Moreover, interest groups may 
themselves be internally undemocratic, meaning that the views of their 
leaders do not necessarily reflect those of their members. In the following 
sections, Swaziland's recent SME Policy is explored through the lenses 
provided by these different theories of state-society relations. 
4.3 Rationale for selecting the SME Policy for Study 
Swaziland has drafted various policies, and one of these, the Draft Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SME) Policy 2004 was selected for detailed 
assessment. This policy is inspired and driven by the National Development 
Strategy (NOS), the Economic and Social Reform Agenda (ESRA) and the 
Millennium Action Plan. The rationale for selecting this particular policy is that 
SMEs present job creation opportunities and economic empowerment, thus 
significantly contributing towards the alleviation of poverty and promoting 
development The SME sector in Swaziland ranges from rural women 
working on their own in a limited part-time capacity through to successful 
Swazi entrepreneurs with influence throughout the region and beyond.78 
Women seeking to earn an income to maintain their families run the majority 
of small businesses. Even though these business ventures are small, they do 
contribute towards the advancement of the country's economy. It is also 
through the SME Policy-making process that the SME Unit was created. 
The SME sector is also important for Swaziland because it provides a means 
for the Swazi nation to own a large percentage of the economy and because it 
enables a larger manufacturing base to be established in the country. 
78 Draft SME Policy, 2004: 10. 
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Moreover, SMEs mean more of the wealth generated in Swaziland remains 
within the country.79 
I n the past, the head of state established economic empowerment funds, such 
as the Enterprise Trust Fund (1995, capital R44 million), and the Small Scale 
Enterprise Loan Guarantee Scheme (1990, capital R5 million). In addition, 
there are also the Tinkhundla Development Fund for the 55 constituencies, as 
well as the Regional Development Fund of R40 million (with each region 
allocated R10 million), to be shared amongst the 55 constituencies.8o 
Many players and key stakeholders have voiced concerns that, in spite of all 
these efforts, small businesses rarely benefit, as interventions have been 
unsystematic.81 This is the reason why it is essential to have a 
decentralisation policy and a fiscal policy to monitor and evaluate the use of 
such funds. 
4.3.1 Donor Practices and Attitudes towards SMEs 
NGOs contributing towards the alleviation of poverty in Swaziland through 
economic development interface with the international community mainly 
through funding and technical assistance support schemes. In Swaziland, the 
general sentiment is that funds for micro-projects, community cooperatives 
and SMEs are readily available from the EU, the United States, the Republic 
of China and others.82 Donor organisations, however, are faced with the 
problem of non-accountability and poor governance on the part of NGOs, as 
there is not adequate pressure on micro finance Institutions and NGOs to 
perform. Only in the case of severe non-execution of their activities might 
donors enforce some diSCipline on the recipients of funding.83 
79 Draft SME Policy, 2004: 11. 
80 Imbita Swaziland Women's Finance Trust 2003-2005 Business Plan. 
8l Ibid. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Ibid. 
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As a result, donors are adopting a new strategy of uniform, private, market 
oriented approaches and policies in supporting institutions that focus on 
economic development.84 They are also working in consortia and adopting 
standard terms and conditions such as objectives, outreach, profitability and 
investor credibility, to determine the direction of their assistance and to 
implement accountability. This new approach is a shift from granting to 
lending and investing.85 
4.3.2 Regulatory Factors 
The SME sector has already suffered from severe policy neglect, and the 
policies that currently govern it are still insignificant and fragmented, 
especially when compared to the wide range of support and services available 
to the formal sector.8S Informal sector participants within the SME, for 
example, often complain of being routinely removed from their business 
locations, their goods being confiscated, receiving frequent demands for 
bribes, being detained and experiencing other forms of harassment.87 
4.4 Overview of the SME Policy 
In Kalu (2004), Mukum Mbaku studies the role of the state in macroeconomic 
performance and development in Africa. He concludes that transition to 
democratic governance in Africa will not improve public policy making until 
each African state puts in place infrastructures that guarantee economic 
freedoms and thus maximise entrepreneurial effort and wealth creation. 
Governments have to provide the people with structures that promote 
peaceful coexistence and that reconstruct the post- independence state in 
ways that create a protective and productive state. 
The Draft SME Policy document states that the absence of a coherent 
national policy has contributed to a lack of clarity with regard to the role and 
84 Imbita Swaziland Women's Finance Trust 2003-2005 Business Plan. p.ll. 
85 Ibid., pll. 
86 Ibid., pll. 
87 Ibid., pit. 
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responsibility of various government agents and a lack of coordination 
between ministries.88 Government efforts to review the progress and 
performance of the SME sector have been thwarted by this lack of a coherent 
policy. A regulatory mechanism for the micro-finance sector still has to be put 
in place to address this issue. 
The Swazi people have a history of missed opportunities in economic 
empowerment. While independence brought Swaziland political autonomy, 
thus far there had been inadequate economic self-reliance, as the Swazi 
people have had minimal ownership of their own economy. Thus there has 
been a need to provide greater opportunities for the economic advancement 
of the Swazi nation through promotion of the SME Sector.89 
The policy document acknowledges the limited participation and decision-
making by local stakeholders, and commits the MEE to clarify government's 
role in support of indigenous entrepreneurs. There is also a commitment for 
improved coordination and a framework that will provide a more systematic 
government approach for the sector. This policy also seeks to promote a 
'joined up' government where there will be linkages both within and outside of 
government. This is because most of ministries were found to playa role in 
SME development, as shown in a study of Ministry and Government Agency 
SUpport9D in respect of SMEs in Swaziland. 
4.4.1 The SME Policy Formulation Process 
The objective of the policy is to involve as many Swazis as possible in real 
opportunities in small businesses.91 The policy marks a new direction and a 
change of emphasis by government, which will henceforth facilitate and 
encourage the growth of the sector rather than driving it through direct 
intervention from central government.92 
88 Draft SME Policy, 2004: 17. 
89 Ibid., p7. 
90 Study of Ministry and Government Agency Support for SMEs: SME Unit, 2002. 
91 Ibid., plO. 
92 Draft SME Policy, 2004: 10. 
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The national policy on SMEs sets out the vision, intention and strategy of the 
kingdom of Swaziland with regard to SME development. The aim of the policy 
is to increase economic empowerment and ownership. It is also aimed at 
addressing deprivation and poverty, increasing economic empowerment, and 
adjusting economic disparities through increased wealth creation.93 
The SME Unit itself was established in April 2001 and is located within the 
MEE. The MEE, which has steered this process, has pledged responsibility 
for refining the policy, its implementation, management and monitoring. 
High levels of unemployment and the low economic performance of the Small 
Medium Micro Enterprises (SMME) sector has forced the Swazi government 
to formulate a policy framework that is intended to enable the sector to 
contribute to the national economy. Not only would this encourage foreign 
investment, but it would also address the continuing discrepancy between 
economic growth and the population growth rate. 
In 1996, the Swaziland Government, represented by the MEE94, requested 
United Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) to undertake a 
project to assist in developing an SME Strategy. It was to be formulated and 
controlled by stakeholders. The overall objective was "to provide a policy 
framework for the creation of an enabling environment for the development of 
sustainable small enterprises and to coordinate the organisations involved in 
small business development for optimal contribution to national economic 
growth.,,95 
Stakeholders identified three policy areas to be addressed in the SME 
Strategy in order to achieve this overall objective: 
• Creation of an enabling environment for the growth of SMEs generally 
through a policy framework, incorporating appropriate legislative or 
regulatory and infrastructural measures; 
93 Draft SME Policy, 2004: 7. 
94 In 1996, the MEE was known as the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. 
95 Task Force Report on Economic Empowerment of Small Medium and Micro Enterprises, 1997: 3. 
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• Measures supporting the creation of new SMEs, especially in the rural 
areas where they are presently few and far between; and 
• Measures supporting the strengthening and diversification of existing 
SMEs.96 
The formulation process included an analysis of the socio-economic 
environment of Swazi SMEs, based on the UNIOO consultants' review of the 
evidence, both in prior studies and through field observation. The diagnosis 
paper was to be circulated among the stakeholders, leading to consultative 
workshops and meetings, bringing them together in order to arrive at collated 
policies, programmes and action plans, which would be integrated and 
combined to form the National SME Strategy.97 
The SMME Task Force came about as a result of a merger between the 
SMME Task Force of the same name, also known at the time as the Prime 
Minister's Task Force (established in 1996 by the then Prime Minister 
Dr Barnabas Olamini) and the National SME Forum.98 The Prime Minister's 
Task Team was a product of the ESRA, which was a short-term strategy 
derived from the longer-term strategy, the NOS. NGOs, such as LULOTE, the 
Imbita Swaziland Women's Financial Trust Fund and BWAS were members of 
both the Prime Minister's Task Force and the National SME Forum. The 
National SME Forum had a provisional steering committee that acted as a 
liaison with government. 
At a joint meeting between the Prime Minister's Task Force and the National 
SME Forum, it was decided that the former be co-opted by the Steering 
Committee of the National SME Forum to work towards the production of the 
SMME Task Force Report, and that the National SME Strategy be the 
foundation for the policy framework. This new body was called the National 
SME Task Force.99 
96 National Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Strategy, 1997: 4. 
97 National Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Strategy, 1997: 1. 
98 SMME is a tenn originally used to refer to Small Medium and Micro Enterprises now called the 
SME (Small Medium Enterprises) 
99 Task Force Report on Economic Empowennent ofSMEs, 1997: 2. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
92 
The report of the National SME Strategy raised important policy issues, 
including: 
• The integration of entrepreneurial skills into the school curriculum; 
• Greater flexibility in the retirement age for early retirement without loss 
of benefits 
• Allocation of Swazi National Land for business purposes; 
• Revision of the Marriage Act 1964; 
• establishment of a small claims mechanism; 
• creation of one-stop shops; greater use of business incentives; and 
most importantly 
• a coordination mechanism for SME promotion. 10o 
The report also listed business opportunities in the SME sector, such as 
making good use of the database of business profiles at the Trade and 
Promotion Unit (TPU); leasing idle government farms with good infrastructure 
and business facilities to SMEs who cannot afford to develop such facilities; 
and licensing small mining operations for mines that have been abandoned by 
large mining companies, and subcontracting by government. 101 
In January 2001, a role clarity workshop was held specifically for members of 
the committee of the National Forum for Small Enterprises. By May 2002, a 
sufficiently wide variety of stakeholders were interested in policy formulation 
to conduct a seminar of fifty-two delegates in Nhlangano. Subsequently, 
individual discussions were entered into with interested parties over a variety 
of issues. 
Much discussion had occurred by June 2002, and there was consensus on 
the need to clarify the relationship between government and the SME 
sector. 102 A study to identify the role of ministries and parastatals in small 
business was commissioned. A series of forty-seven meetings was held with 
100 National Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Strategy, 1997. 
101 Ibid. 
102Draft SME Policy, 2004: 14. 
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representatives from government and parastatals. By August 2002, it was felt 
that enough consultation had occurred and that enough information had been 
collected to produce an initial draft policy statement. During the policy drafting 
stage, and after the document had been refined, it was circulated for comment 
to several institutions and individuals. A final workshop was held in 2004 to 
incorporate all inputs received during 2003/04. The document states that 
further comments remain welcome. The policy is now before Cabinet, 
awaiting approval. A summary of the SME Policy Formulation Process is 
illustrated below. 
Date Activity Actors 
1991 GEMINI report emphasises GEMINI DIA Inc. Bethesda, 
importance of the SME sector in Maryland, USA, 
Swaziland 
1996 • Formulation of the National • Prime Minster and 
Development Strategy (NOS) stakeholders 
and the Economic and Social • Ministry of Enterprise and 
Reform Agenda (ESRA) Employment 
• Government commissions 
UNIDO to design an SME 
Strategy 
1997 Comprehensive needs UNIDO 
assessment of the SME sector is 
undertaken 
.1997 • Establishment of the Prime Prime Minster and stakeholders 
Minster's Task Force 
• PM's Task Force is co-opted 
into the National SME Forum 
1999 European Development Fund EDF 
(EDF) study leads to 
recommendations, including 
establishing an SME unit within 
the MEE 
• Formulation of the National All relevant stakeholders 
SME Forum including NGOs, private sector 
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• Initiation of the Prime 
Minister's Task Force 
• Merging of the two bodies 
into one 
January Role Clarity Workshop 
2001 
Late 2001- Consultation process, policy 
2002 analysis and development 
15 April Establishment of the SME Unit 
2001 
November EU programme of support for 
2001 policy development initiated 
20-22 May Workshop held at Nhlangano 
2002 • Presentation of organisation 
and institution profiles 
• Development of a policy for 
the SME sector 
June 2002 • Sufficient agreement on need 
to clarify relationship between 
government and SME sector 
• Study commissioned to 
identify the role of Ministries, 
and parastatals with small 
businesses 
• 47 meetings held 
August First draft policy statement 
2002 
December Consultation process to secure 
2002 support 
2003/2004 Inputs from different sectors 
incorporated into final draft 
document 
and government 
Committee Members of the 
NSMEF, EU and government 
All relevant stakeholders 
including NGOs, private sector 
and government 
Stakeholders, mainly 
government 
EU 
• SME Unit 
• All relevant stakeholders 
including NGOs, private 
sector and government 
• Facilitator: Managing Director 
of Lwati Management 
Services: Mr Martin Forsyth 
Thompson 
Government and parastatal 
representatives 
Government and stakeholders 
Government and stakeholders 
All relevant stakeholders 
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1
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Final draft consolidated SME Unit Director and technical 
staff 
Final draft document presented SME Unit Director and technical 
to Cabinet staff 
4.4.2 Participation of NGOs 
In Swaziland, NGOs are housed under the Ministry of Home Affairs. There is 
no special enabling instrument for NGO participation in the policy-making 
process or in any other national activities. However, CANGO has coordinated 
efforts towards the drafting of an NGO Policy that would make provision for 
precisely such an instrument. The first of such efforts was made in 1988, and 
the second in 2002. The National Policy on NGOs remains in draft form, 
awaiting approval by Cabinet. 
The various NGOs gave their own accounts and experiences of this process, 
which is discussed in the next section. 
4.5 Case Study 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the nature of NGO participation in policy-making 
processes in Swaziland is best illustrated through a case study. The following 
is a descriptive theoretical case study, based on the theory that civil society 
(including NGOs) is separate from the sate and that citizens perceive civil 
society as an agent of change and expect it to drive certain processes, such 
as democratisation and policy formulation. The case study identifies the 
different stakeholders who participated in the SME policy-making process and 
shows the discrepancies and contradictions that mark a policy-making 
process. 
4.5.1 Methodology 
The case study was carried out by means of a literature review and interviews 
with the NGOs that participated in the SME Policy-making process. 
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Interviews were also conducted with organisations that could have 
participated in the process but did not. A questionnaire was used to conduct 
structured face-to-face interviews with respondents. Other NGOs who are 
known for their generally active participation in national processes were 
interviewed too. Lastly, discussions and interviews were held with other 
individuals who have useful knowledge about the topic of public policy and 
SMEs in Swaziland. 
4.5.2 Confidentiality and Ethics 
Throughout the case study, there are direct quotes from those interviewed. 
However, the interviewees were assured of confidentiality, and their identities 
will therefore not be revealed. It is acknowledged that it would have been 
instructive and that additional valuable information might have been added by 
identifying them. However, because of the small size of the country, and the 
communal and congenial nature of personal and professional relations in 
Swaziland, they would have been easily identifiable. This would have 
jeopardised their current and future working relations with other NGOs, 
donors and government. The protection of such sources is also in keeping 
with the university's stand on confidentiality. 
4.5.3 Selection of NGOs Interviewed 
Originally, four NGOs participated in the SME Policy formulation process, 
namely the Women's Resource Centre, the Imbita Swaziland Women's Trust 
Fund and LULOTE. However, sources told of how other NGOs participated in 
the process, although they were not reflected in the document. Organisations 
such as the SECLOF, World Vision International and WUS are said to have 
participated. The fact that they are not specifically named in the documents 
might indicate the sporadic nature of their participation, which is an issue that 
will be addressed further in the discussion. 
The researcher also explored other NGOs whose activities of income 
generation, savings, credit and loan schemes meant that they would have 
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been qualified to participate in this process, even though they did not do so. 
These are ACAT, CARITAS, LOS, Baphalali Red Cross Society, and FLAS. 
Other NGOs such as CSC, WLRSA, LeaRN and WLSA were interviewed 
because of the active role they have played in other national processes. 
Interviews were conducted between 24 January-4 February 2005 in Manzini 
and Mbabane 
4.5.4 Profile of Interviewed NGOs 
From the interviews it emerged that these organisations interviewed had 
changed substantially from when they were originally established. Many had 
changed in size and structure and, even more importantly, with regard to their 
vision, mission, objectives and activities. These changes can be attributed to 
a variety of factors. Firstly, NGOs including CANGO have been affected by 
high staff turnover (CANGO has had three Directors within the last five years) 
due to several reasons, mainly funding and job insecurity. Secondly, so-
called 'donor fatigue' and changing requirements of donor agencies have also 
led NGOs to change in response (Michael, 2004). 
Some organisations interviewed (specifically WRC and WUS) are on the brink 
of collapse. In addition to this, standards have dropped to such an extent that 
it is not possible to readily access the necessary information from the 
organisation, even at the basic level of issuing a pamphlet or brochure giving 
the profile of the organisation. 
The organisations that participated in the SME policy formulation process are 
all indigenous Swazi organisations mostly established by local women and 
entrepreneurs in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They are, however, all 
interna~ionally funded with no government subventions and limited local 
support from the business community. Although they receive no government 
subvention, they do maintain good relations with the relevant ministries.103 
103 Ministry of Home Affairs Gender Unit, Ministry of Enterprise and Employment, Ministry of 
Tourism and Information, and Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. 
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Most are affiliated to regional and international organisations and to some of 
the local NGO Consortia. 
The organisations being studied herein had been established to assist in 
developing small aspiring entrepreneurs by equipping them with business 
management skills and granting them easy access to credit and savings 
schemes. 
Looking at the broader spectrum of NGOs interviewed, they varied in terms of 
levels of participation, representation, contribution and experience in 
participating in policy-making processes or involvement in national decision-
making processes. FLAS is one of the older organisations, having been 
established in 1979 and which has immense experience of participating in 
policy processes in Swaziland, such as in the formulation of the NDS, the 
Health Policy, the HIV/AIDS Policy and the Population Policy. Furthermore, 
FLAS was represented at a high level of the Population Policy process, with 
the then Director serving as a member of the National Council on Population 
and Development. 
FLAS participated indirectly in these policies because of their skill and 
expertise in conducing research. Kobla Quashie, a firm of chartered 
accountants, for instance, was contracted to conduct research on small 
businesses in Swaziland; they in turn approached FLAS to provide the actual 
research services through their Research Unit. 
WLSA is a regional research organisation that did not participate fully in the 
SME Policy-making process but nonetheless had the opportunity to present a 
paper on the legal status and position of women, particularly in business. 
Their presentation was of great policy significance, as it highlighted the 
hindrances and obstacles faced by women in business. 
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4.5.5 Summary of Findings 
4.5.5.1 General NGO Participation in national processes 
In discussing with the NGOs the issue of NGO participation in policy-making 
processes and other national decision-making processes, most of the 
interviewees noted their limited participation therein. With regard to the 
reasons advanced by them, few had to do with the prevailing political situation 
at national level meaning there was no tangible proof of state surveillance. 
Two respondents, however, mentioned that some of these processes were 
closed to participation, attributing them to the prevailing political 
circumstances. Apart from that, none of the interviewees made a direct 
connection between participation and democracy. This might be because of 
the apolitical stance they have already assumed, which gives them no good 
reason to make such a link. Conversely, it could might well be that their 
participation or non-participation is truly unconnected to national politics. 
Most of them did point out their own weaknesses, saying that NGOs ought to 
take it upon themselves to ensure that they participate. "NGOs need to 
aggressively market themselves to be recognised so that they are both seen 
and heard." one respondent explained. 104 Another respondent said that 
NGOs needed to create a space for themselves, where they could participate. 
Initially, she had remarked that some policy-making processes were open 
whereas others were closed to them. In terms of the latter, she mentioned the 
recent constitution-making process and the inability to make group 
submissions. She said, "NGOs should have lobbied enough to find 
themselves space to participate in the process and to make submissions on 
behalf of their constituencies.,,105 
104 Interview with a Programme Officer of an NGO on 31 January 2005 in Manzini. 
105 Interview with the Coordinator of a women's organisation on I February 2005 in Mbabane. 
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4.5.5.2 Securing Information 
A different source said that the globalisation of information and technology 
has made access easier, and that NGOs in fact have fewer excuses not to 
participate in policy processes. 106 The media has furthermore assumed an 
important role in enabling policy makers and others to inform and invite 
stakeholders through both electronic and print media (which is mainly 
accessible to NGOs), except that they may be oblivious to the communication 
because of their other organisational commitments. She cited invitations to 
Commissions of Enquiry, Environment Impact Assortments, Roads and Dams 
(Maguga) Construction and the National Constitution Making Process. The 
respondent noted though that other problems that could affect partiCipation in 
these fora is the time factor (meetings are often scheduled for the evenings). 
The main point made by the respondent was that NGOs needed to shift their 
mindset from expecting formal invitations to participate in national processes, 
which the government is only reluctantly making more open and accessible. 
These changes are obviously being resisted by those in power, which means 
that stakeholders cannot afford to wait to be invited. 
4.5.5.3 Policy Advocacy 
With regard to policy advocacy, it was mentioned that, in order for NGOs to 
participate effectively in these processes, they need the capacity to articulate 
issues and bring out the voices of their clients. 107 The source noted that it 
was the duty of CANGO to assess and provide this type of capacity. 
Interviewees highlighted the need to acquire advocacy and lobbying skills, so 
that NGOs can speak in one voice. The need to strengthen the voices of 
NGOs in general was also stressed. Currently advocacy assumes an ad hoc, 
event-oriented approach, which can be seen in the celebration and 
commemoration of certain events. 10B In an interview with the CANGO 
106 Interview with the Coordinator of a women's organisation on I February 2005 in Mbabane. 
107 Interview with the Director of an agricultural organisation on 3 February 2005 in Mbabane. 
108 Interview with the Director of a women's organisation on 3 February 2005 in Mbabane. 
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Director, he acknowledged that some NGOs lacked the capacity to engage 
policy. 
A UNISWA lecturer in Public Administration109 noted that government has 
embraced principles of participation but that this needs to be improved. He 
expressed a similar view on NGOs in terms of Policy Advocacy, saying that 
NGOs needed to sharpen their skills to persuade. He added that policy 
advocacy needed to be institutionalised, as this is presently not the case. 
4.5.5.4 The Coordinating Role of CANGO 
As previously mentioned, GANGO has the paramount task of influencing 
public policy by representing NGOs in policy formulation and review fora. It 
also has the duty to coordinate NGO activities. GANGO participates in its 
capacity as the Secretariat, representing interests of NGOs in the policy-
making process. The organisation has thus far participated in the NDS, the 
Gender Policy. the HIV/AIDS Policy, the Environment Policy, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy and Action Plan and the Decentralisation Policy.11o 
At the same time, GANGO is tasked with the responsibility of inviting NGOs to 
participate in policy-making processes. Some organisations have 
acknowledged the role GANGO has played in this regard, whereas others 
were critical of it, noting the delays in invitations. It was stated that invitations 
or correspondence from GANGO was usually late, thus making it difficult for 
NGOs to re-arrange their schedules, given the planned timeframes for 
programmes, as presented to the donor. A source111 pointed out that 
disjointed coordination was a feature of most coordinating bodies, especially 
in the SADG region (see also Michael, 2004). Another source, in contrast, 
commended the work done by GANGO and put the blame on government. 
109 Interview held on 25 January 2005 at UNISW A. 
I!O Director of CANGo. 
111 Interview with the Coordinator ofa women's organisation on I February 2005 in Mbabane. 
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The belief was that government would casually delay informing CANGO, thus 
making it difficult for CANGO to invite NGOs in time.112 
CANGO's view in this regard was that the government needed to involve 
NGOs early on in the process and to make information available for them to 
contribute effectively. Delays are likely to result in inconsistency in 
representation or in no representation at all, as staff members and other 
organisational resources, such as transport, are often already committed to 
other activities. Another point related to such delays is that of the duration of 
proceedings. CANGO or government should state the duration of 
proceedings so that NGOs can plan and prepare their schedules accordingly. 
The lengthier the time taken, the more sporadic the representations from 
NGOs tend to become, as their resources become scarce. 
This point is related to government's tendency to drag out issues until the trail 
goes cold, so to speak. The issue of lack of finalisation or adoption of policies 
and implementation was mentioned earlier herein. Most NGOs had even 
forgotten some of the policy processes they had previously participated in, 
such as the NGO Policy, which has been pending for the past sixteen 
years.113 This ultimately creates a lack of confidence in government, as was 
remarked by one source. 
Some respondents noted how some processes were initially open, but 
gradually became closed, leaving out NGOs in the process. This raises 
questions of credibility and ownership of these processes. 
4.5.5.5 Donor Funding 
Donor funding remains a challenge, as it results in NGOs spending a 
significant part of their time fund raising. Funds are important, because they 
provide job security; sustain the organisation and ensure the implementation 
of programme activities that attract the donor's interest. However, donor 
112 Interview with Director of an agricultural organisation on 3 February 2005 in Mbabane. 
113 Telephone interview with fonner Director of a faith based organisation on 2 February 2005. 
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fatigue has reached unprecedented proportions. It was the view of one 
Director that CANGO needs to clarify to potential donors, the funding 
problems affecting all NGOs during future fund raising efforts with donors. He 
observed that the silence of NGOs on issues of concern makes it seem as 
though NGOs were being subsidised by government and thus vocally 
paralysed, yet that is not the case.114 
Thus, it can be safely concluded that NGOs participate in national processes 
but that their participation is not that effective. A respondent decried this 
situation, noting that NGOs seem to have lost their strength and zest. He 
pointed out that this could be because of the high staff turnover in these 
organisations, that the new employees are new in the field and that their 
capacity first needs to be built (Mojo and Katerere, 1992: 2, quoted in Michael, 
2004). He further noted that NGOs seem to be ineffective because, even if 
they do participate, it is mainly in terms of physical representation without 
constructive input. In the end, though, participation occurs at different levels, 
where some participants are knowledgeable and able to follow proceedings, 
while others are not. 
4.5.5.6 Maintaining Interest in Policy Issues 
Another view was that NGOs, CBOs and communities are only enthusiastic 
about short-term returns as opposed to long-term gains. 115 For instance, they 
understand and are willing to participate in policies and matters that tackle the 
poverty situation such as land, water, employment, food and medication, as 
opposed to those pertaining to gender issues, human rights and the 
constitution. In other words, they seem to need something tangible. It is thus 
advisable for NGOs as representatives of the people to simplify issues and 
concepts, to ensure that everyone. can understand these holistically, and not 
to view them as separate from their daily lives. Policies should directly 
address their concerns and needs. 
114 Interview with the Director of an agricultural organisation on 3 February 2005 in Mbabane. 
115 Director ofa women's organisation held on3 February 2005 in Mbabane. 
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4.6 Participation in the SME Policy 
4.6.1 Organisational Representation 
As previously mentioned, some NGOs did participate at different stages of the 
process. In some instances, the person who specifically participated in some 
of the processes had left the organisation, and no proper handover or 
reporting for record and continuity purposes was ever made. Respondents 
continually referred to the participation of the WRC in a particular process, but 
the organisation's office had no trace of such participation. At the time of the 
policy formulation process, the organisation was experiencing problems, 
especially funding. The person who supposedly participated had moved on to 
the EU Micro-Projects.116 
WUS related a similar experience, where the officer in charge had left the 
organisation to start her own credit and savings scheme, leaving no 
information behind her about the NGO's participation in the SME Policy.117 
LULOTE presented a different scenario because, although the person had 
held two subsequent jobs after leaving the organisation, the Director had been 
closely involved in the process, from its beginnings where the proposal to 
establish an SME Unit was first made and throughout the policy-making 
process. The organisation also had the advantage that the Director was a 
newly appointed Senator. 
Those who participated directly in the process held the view that NGOs did at 
least have the opportunity to present their organisation's programmes in a 
session where all other participants were doing presentations about their 
respective institutions. 118 It was thus pointed out that the proceedings during 
the drCift stage had been open. The source further said that participants had 
been vocal and had raised pertinent and practical issues. 
116 Infonnation gathered from staff members of a women's economic empowennent organisation in 
Manzini on 31 January 2005. 
1I7 Infonnation sourced from Financial Officer at a community resource organisation in Manzini on 31 
January in Manzini. 
118 Interview with the Coordinator ofa women's finance organisation on 24 January 2005 in Manzini. 
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Her view was that representation from business (such as the Swaziland 
Investment Promotion Authority, the Sibakho Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and the Swazi Business Council) had such a high profile that she felt 
lost and out of place. Small or micro businesses were not well represented 
and there had generally been a feeling that the people at grassroots level 
were being neglected. The SMEs that were represented were those assisted 
by public enterprises. 
The SME Unit could have considered different options of participation for the 
different stakeholders, such as having macro businesses deliberating 
separately from micro organisation, and then combining their contributions. 
Dividing stakeholders into sectors, as was done in the Population Policy 
process, might have been helpful in the circumstances. Conversely, though, 
the joint deliberations of macro and micro organisations would have enabled 
them to understand each other's differing areas of concern. They would also 
have learnt from each other, particularly micro businesses who aspire to 
become macro businesses. 
4.6.2 Representing Community Needs 
Although the representation of community issues and needs was not the 
focus of this study, two Directors referred to this issue during the discussions. 
The first point related to capacity. The point was that there is a need for 
NGOs to be well equipped with skills that enable them genuinely to represent 
the needs of their clients. 119 The other point related to feedback and lines of 
communication that ought to exist between NGOs and their constituencies. 
This pertains specifically to simplifying and reporting back to communities on 
policies and policy issues. The final point they made was that it is important 
for government to ensure that NGOs are involved throughout the policy-
making process, so that NGOs can report back fully to their respective 
constituencies. 
119 Interview with the Director of a reproductive health organisation on 27 January 2005 in Manzini and 
another interview with the Director of an agricultural organisation on 3 February 2005 in Mbabane. 
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4.7 SME Issues 
Further sentiments expressed were that the margin that determines small and 
medium businesses was rather high for what would be considered as a small 
business.12o The respondent further pointed out that there were no proper 
linkages or understanding between small and big businesses. This point was 
repeatedly raised, even by people who were not directly involved in SMEs, 
such as a lecturer in Business Administration from UNISWA121 and the CEO 
of SEDCO. 122 They said that the margin set for small businesses was not 
indicative of the size of the businesses that participating NGOs represented. 
As a result, the policy might not be suitable for small or micro businesses. 
In this connection, one Director said that the SME policy did not encourage 
small businesses to grow, but rather to remain small. Another observation 
was that participation of NGOs was limited, especially with regard to the 
representation of micro finance organisations. The respondent further noted 
that the policy was mainly aimed at SMEs, focusing on counselling and 
Business Development Services (BDS). 
Another Director highlighted the problem of reserving insignificant businesses 
for Swazis and lucrative ones (for instance textiles) for foreigners. She noted 
that the policy should regulate the amounts that foreigners could invest so that 
they did not present unfair competition for local businesses, such as fast food 
outlets and supermarkets currently operated by foreigners. 
4.7.1 The SME Unit 
A source noted the tendency of government to hijack processes initiated by 
NGOs and, in most instances, spoiling them. The view was that the 
government had not been interested in the SME issue, until the SME Forum 
had finally made its point heard and secured funding from the EU to establish 
an SME Unit. At that point, the government became interested and ultimately 
120 Interview with the Coordinator ofa women's finance organisation on 24 January 2005 in Manzini. 
121 Interview held on 24 January 2005 at UNISW A 
122 Interview held on 26 January 2005 in Mbabane 
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took over the process. 123The initiators had not wanted the SME Unit to be 
completely a government body, although it has since become one. As a 
result, the original goals of the SME Unit have been lost. 
The source said further that the SME Unit was initially meant to be a semi-
government body with the forum having full control over it through Directors 
who would have been drawn from the Committee members. A Director would 
be employed to run the SME Unit. It was never quite clear whether the 
Director of the SME Unit was to be a civil servant or not. When the current 
Director was interviewed, this was done by the Committee members as 
opposed to by the Civil Service Board (which normally interviews and hires 
civil servants); it was expected that he would not be in fact a civil servant. 
Government's support was solicited in terms of providing necessary 
resources, such as paying a salary to the proposed Director of the SME Unit. 
This was intended to be a temporary arrangement, while the Forum tried to 
establish itself and generate income through consultancy fees charged for 
training and other services rendered. The present situation, however, is that 
the SME Director is fully employed as a civil servant housed at the MEE. 
A different source 124 said that it might be inappropriate to say the government 
had hijacked the SME Unit and Policy process. Firstly, the funding that had 
been secured for the establishment of the SME Unit had come through 
UNIDO, who had channelled the funding through the government, and so 
government already had a stake in the matter. Nonetheless, it might be 
supposed that the government has the tendency to want to take over 
processes because funding of these has been channelled through 
government. 
The second source acknowledged the fact that the National Small and 
Medium Enterprises Forum (NSMEF) had wanted the SME Unit to fall under 
123 Interview with a member of a women's business organisation on 4 February 2005 in Mbabane. 
124 Telephone interview with founding member of the SME Policy process and SME Unit on 10 March 
2005. 
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its control, and governed by the Committee members (as a board of 
Directors), but explained that this was not logistically possible in terms of 
funding and other necessary resources. It was noted that if the structure had 
been outside government, neutrality in issues such as licensing and 
deregulation would be maintained. 
It was also observed that most government ministries have SME components 
and that these needed to be coordinated to overcome the current 
fragmentation. 
4.8 Gender Issues 
A respondent representing a women's cooperative said that she sensed 
resistance on the part of government towards gender issues and women's 
organisations. 125Following her presentation, one of the key officials from the 
SME Unit told the gathering that they did not want to be seen as being 
discriminatory by focusing on special groups such as women; he was clearly 
missing the pOint. 
The SME policy shows that women own 70% of small businesses; it thus 
follows that the interests of women should be more prominent in the 
document. 
4.9 Additional Issues 
A source126 confirmed that, in Swaziland, government initiates policies. The 
sentiment was that the government needs to pay more attention to 
understanding the needs of the people, and thus to recognise the relevance 
and significance of policy initiatives. He observed that the Swazi government 
would not make an effort to discover these needs and concerns, but would 
rather formulate policies at central level without much consultation. It was 
thus proposed that government should view NGOs as partners who could 
125 Interview with the Coordinator of a women's finance organisation on 24 January 2005 in Manzini. 
126 Interview with Chief Executive Officer of a parastataI 26 January 2005 in Mbabane. 
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close the gap between government and the citizens, in situations where it is 
unable to implement programmes. 
He proposed that, as a result, "affected stakeholders should take the initiative 
to form a force to initiate a policy. Otherwise their lack of direction and unity 
makes government indifferent to these needs as it finds no priority in them." 
The SME Policy seems to be one of those policies that has attracted attention 
and has moved faster than most towards implementation. A Director noted 
that the pace assumed by a policy during the formulation and development 
process depends on who initiates it. 127 She cited the example of the Draft 
NGO Policy that was drafted because NGOs were pressing for a formal 
document to address important issues, such as operations, collaborative 
partnerships with government and subventions. Similarly, the driving force 
behind the SME Policy has set its pace of development. The fact that the 
SME Forum initiated it, gives it strength. By the time the PM at the time 
introduced the NDS and the Task Force, he had to acknowledge that the SME 
Forum initiative was already in place, hence the need for consolidation of the 
two. 
As Caritas rarely participates in policy-making processes in Swaziland, it also 
did not participate in the SME policy. The Refugee Programme officer 
mentioned that participation in and invitation to policy processes depends on 
who you are. Emphasising the point on advocacy, he said that NGOs needed 
to market themselves aggressively to ensure representation. 
The officer stated that participation in the SME Policy would have benefited 
the organisation, and especially Refugee Entrepreneurs. This would have 
complemented an initiative that had once existed, viz. a Refugee 
Entrepreneur Forum, whose major objective was to integrate refugees into the 
mainstream economy. One of the challenges listed by Refugee 
Entrepreneurs was the issue of licensing, which becomes cumbersome 
because of their status. Ownership of business property was another issue 
127 Interview with the Director of a business management organisation on 2 February 2005 in Manzini. 
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for them. Generally, the temporary nature of their (immigration) status meant 
that it was doubtful whether they would be allowed to continue working in the 
country and to expand their businesses further. Repayment of loans 
becomes another issue that causes them concern, as does the servicing of 
debts. 
4.10 Conclusion 
Group theories try to identify and explain the relationships between the state 
and different groups in society. The case study has shown that in Swaziland 
various groups have influence on the state. Pressure groups representing the 
interests of citizens playa vital role in the policy-making process. On the one 
hand, the case study has identified that the Pluralist model sheds some light 
on policy making in Swaziland, as different interest groups, including NGOs, 
are engaged in these processes. On the other hand, there are also pervasive 
elements of Elitism, in the sense that decisions are mainly taken by a small 
minority. 
As shown, the SME Policy formulation process was participatory in that an 
attempt was made to involve many stakeholders, including NGOs. However 
there were issues of inconsistency in representation. Participation occurred at 
different levels and to varying degrees, thus intimidating some of the smaller 
organisations that participated. Some of the NGOs interviewed during this 
research acknowledged their lack of capacity and the needed for 
strengthening it. They needed to create a space for themselves to participate 
in national policy-making processes. 
An important finding of the study was that, even though the SME Policy 
. appeared participatory at first sight, there are underlying currents surrounding 
the status of the SME Unit. It remains unclear who initiated the SME Policy-
making process. Original members of the SME Forum claim that they initiated 
the process, and that this is why it attracted so much attention. In the end, 
though, the SME Unit was taken over by the government. Others hold an 
opposite view, claiming that it would not have been possible for the NSMEF to 
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house the SME Unit at the time. Some of the respondents claimed that the 
process of drafting this policy had been smooth, and that there had been no 
conflicts, as issues were clarified and resolved amicably. These responses 
are not convincing, though, as participants in this process left with some level 
of dissatisfaction over items that had seemed insignificant at the time. 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
5.1 Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to assess the extent and nature of participation 
of Swazi NGOs in the policy-making process of government. By extension, 
the study examined the role of democracy and participation in the country's 
policy-making process. The most important finding is that the policy-making 
process in Swaziland is affected by the same duality that pervades Swazi life 
in general. Neocosmos (2002) submits that the king has found it increasingly 
difficult to claim a position 'above politics' where he can be a genuine 
representative of the nation. His political partiality is apparent to all as shown 
by his refusal to repeal the 1973 decree (Neocosmos, 2002: 35). 
The complexity of Swaziland's political and social turmoil is made more 
difficult to understand because of causal relationships that make minimal 
sense to the modern and industrialised world. The symbols of kingship, for 
example, are more than mere tokens: to the key participants in the drafting of 
public policies, they are real, and of frightening power and efficacy.128 
This situation will obviously exacerbate the problems of finding a way for 
Swaziland's political and social order to undergo an orderly transformation 
into a modern state, as this would involve an assault on the entire mystery of 
Swazi kingship and its religious and magical significance in the social fabric of 
rural Swazi society.129 Numerous cabinet reshuffles have been seized upon 
as signs, either of impending change or of a hardening of the political arteries. 
More often than not, however, they were means of procrastination.13o 
The absence of a constitution also poses a problem. Even after the Draft 
Constitution is adopted (which is yet to happen), significant work will have to 
be done on it to ensure efficient policy making at all levels. 
128 Institute for Security Studies, Swaziland-History and Politics 
129 Ibid. 
130 Ibid. 
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This study has found, though, that the relationship between civil society and 
the state has changed. Scholars have different views as to where exactly the 
boundary between them lies, and which elements belong to the state and 
which belong to civil society. What matters, is that civil society is treated as 
being separate from the state. 
Although NGOs in Swaziland do not operate under a specific instrument or 
piece of legislation, they do so relatively freely. However, government has 
made it clear that NGOs have to be 'apolitical' in nature, which explains the 
common tendency of NGOs to tread cautiously when addressing critical 
issues of national concern, such as land, human rights and democracy. 
Despite the sometimes-difficult relationship between NGOs and government, 
NGOs in Swaziland are largely credible and nurture a reasonable working 
relationship with government, often co-hosting and co-funding activities. 
Ordinarily, this would make it difficult for them to hold government 
accountable for its actions. Although NGOs are not subsidised by 
government, or as strong as they are in neighbouring states, such as South 
Africa, they have contributed to development and democratisation processes. 
They have potential to improve the lives of ordinary people in Swaziland, 
especially through participating in policy-making processes. 
The study also showed that Swaziland has drafted and prepared many 
policies that have not yet been adopted. This shows the outstanding amount 
of work to be done around policy development and implementation. The three 
arms of government (viz. the Judiciary, the Legislative and the Executive) 
need to be involved in their respective capacities and ensure that oversight 
functions are carried out. 
The majority of Swazi people have been excluded from the country's policy 
development, both of local and foreign policy. Moreover, no sooner has a 
policy been formulated, than it is often either changed or discarded. The 
NOS, for instance, initiated by the then Prime Minister, was intended to be a 
long-term strategy, but it has been sidetracked, working only on paper and not 
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in practice. Soon afterward the appointment of the present Prime Minister, 
SPEED (Smart Programme on Economic Empowerment and Development) 
was established, with little explanation and connection to the NDS. 
Consequently, it has become difficult to update citizens on national 
developments because it is difficult to find a starting point. 
The case study showed that even where the policy-making processes may 
seem smooth, they are not. With the SME policy, the various participants 
held differing and conflicting views on certain issues but these were ignored 
and disregarded. It was further found that government lacks effective 
methods for involving stakeholders in policy making. CANGO, too, has to 
improve its coordinating role if it is to ensure a more effective participation of 
NGOs. NGOs, for their part, need to take the initiative and create a space for 
themselves to participate and present their views. They also need to 
represent the interests of their constituencies more effectively. A lack of 
capacity in terms of human and financial resources was cited as a specific 
challenge faced by NGOs. It also transpired that NGOs need extensive 
training in advocacy and advocacy skills, and that communication and 
planning within and between government and the NGO sector needs to be 
streamlined. 
The study indicates the importance of a constitution and of the implementation 
of democratic principles, which will in turn encourage the culture of 
participation. There are in addition a number of political implications for 
governance and policy. The repeal of the 1973 Decree is recommended in 
this regard, as it hinders constructive participation, a point reinforced by some 
of the respondents. 
Resolving the tensions inherent in a dual legal system is also important and 
capacity building within government and government institutions is necessary. 
This should be extended to NGOs and caos, as these are organisations that 
strive to represent the views of rural communities. An enabling instrument 
might be provided for NGOs to contribute towards the formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of public policies. 
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Parliamentarian's role should be clearly described and their responsibility to 
oversee the Executive set out clearly. 
The PPCU might be strengthened in personnel obtaining technical terms. 
Effective communication and cooperation between the institutions responsible 
for policymaking in Swaziland - such as the PPCU, the AG and Parliament-
might improve the quality of policymaking. 
It would also be desirable to speed up the decentralisation process. A Fiscal 
Decentralisation Policy could complement the Decentralisation Policy, and the 
establishment of Policy Units within government ministries and NGOs would 
be helpful in this regard. Decentralisation would mean that structures and 
processes involved in policy-making are now accessible to communities 
therefore creating the platform for NGOs to empower communities to 
influence these processes. Capacity building for NGOs including CANGO is 
essential. Areas of focus for such capacity building for NGOs include 
advocacy, lobbying, fundraising and policy analysis. Improving the lines of 
communication and strengthening partnerships between government and 
NGOs and between other NGOs is vital. 
Those who have studied Swaziland agree that it is desirable for the country to 
retain its culture and tradition. However if the monarchy is to be maintained, 
its powers need to be regulated within a democratic and constitutional 
context. Swaziland has the potential to become a healthy democracy in which 
NGOs can operate vibrantly, contributing positively to policy development, 
good governance and the welfare of the people. 
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Annexure I 
RESEARCH QUESTIONNAIRE 
This questionnaire has been designed to assess the extent to which 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) participate in the Policy-
Making Process in Swaziland 
Section 1 is general information on the organisation. Please take the time to 
read the questions carefully and answer as fully as possible. 
Section 1 
1. Name of the organisation: 
2. Physical Address: 
3. Contact Details (postal address, telephone, fax and email): 
4. Type of Organisation (national, international, indigenous, local 
organisation ): 
5. When was it established? 
6. Why was it established? 
7. By whom was it founded? 
8. What is the vision or mission statement of the organisation? 
9. What are the organisation's objectives? 
10. What are the activities of the organisation? 
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11. How is the organisation funded? (domestic, local, government, 
international) 
12. How is the organisation structured in terms of hierarchy? 
13. How is the organisation structured in terms of operation (departments, 
desks)? 
14. What are the achievements of the organisation? 
15. What are the challenges of the organisation? 
16. What network! alliances! partnerships does the organisation have? 
17. What relationship does the organisation have with government? 
Section 2 
Section 2 focuses mainly on the participation of NGOs in the 
policymaking processes. Please take the time to read the questions 
carefully and answer as fully as possible. Please be assured that all 
ethical standards and principles of confidentiality shall be adhered 
to. You will not be identifiable through your responses. 
1. Can you please tell me what the organisation has done to try to 
influence a local decision? (Government or Parliament) 
2. How does the organisation view the impending national socio-political 
and economic issues and processes? 
3. To what extent did the organisation partiCipate in the Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SME) Policy formulation process? 
4. In what capacity was the organisation represented? 
5. At what stage of the process did the organisation start taking part? 
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6. If participation was interrupted/ delayed during the process, what were 
the reasons? 
7. How were conflicts and differences of views and perspectives mediated 
during the development of policy instruments? 
8. To what extent do you think NGOs participated in this process? Please 
explain? 
9. What do you think was the effect of the organisation's participation? 
10. Generally, do you think that NGOs were well represented in the 
process? Please explain. 
11 . Are you satisfied that the contents of the final document are a true 
reflection of your submissions/ views/ contributions? 
12. What do you think of the document in its present state? 
13. How do you think the process could have been improved? 
Is there anything else you would like to add that I might have omitted that 
would enrich the assessment of NGO participation in policy-making 
processes? 
Thank you for your time 
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Annexure II 
List of Interviewees 
1. Acting Director: Women's Resource Centre: Mrs Qubile Simelane 
2. Area Development Programme (ADP) Team Leader: World Vision 
International: Ms Thulile Dube 
3. Chief Executive Officer SEDCO: Mr Paul Tsabedze 
4. Coordinator of Imbita Swaziland Women's Finance Trust: Ms Sibongile 
Mthembu 
5. Coordinator: LeaRN: Mrs Elizabeth Shongwe 
6. Coordinator: WLSA: Ms Lomcebo Dlamini 
7. Development Attache: EU - Mr Jorge Nieto 
8. Deputy Director: Lutheran Development Services: Mr Robert Shabangu 
9. Director of ACAT: Mr Enoch Dlamini 
10. Director of Baphalali Red Cross Society: Ms Sibongile Mazibuko 
11. Director of CANGO: Mr Emmanuel Ndlangamandla 
12. Director of FLAS: Mr Musa Mgogo 
13. Director of LULOTE: Ms Nokukhanya Gamedze 
14. Director of SMEs: Mr Bertram Stewart 
15. Director of the PPCU: Mr Vincent Matsebula 
16. Economist in the DPM's Office: Mr Dumsani Sithole 
17. Former Director of LOS: Ms Pamela Meggitt 
18. Head of Department: Justice Peace and Reconciliation: Council of 
Churches: Mr Muzi Masuku 
19. Independent Consultant: Ms Thembayena Dlamini 
20. President: Business Women's Association of Swaziland: Ms Dumsile 
Sigwane 
21. Press and Public Affairs Officer at The British High Commission: 
Mr Michael Motsa 
22. Promotion Officer: Mr Michael Zwane 
23. Programme Officer: Caritas Refugee Programme: Mr Reginald 
Magagula 
24. Regional Coordinator: WLRSA: Ms Doo Aphane 
25. Senior Parliamentary Counsel - Attorney General's Office: Mr Sabelo 
Matsebula 
26. UNICEF: Policy Advocacy and Institutional Support Project Officer: Ms 
Veli Riba 
27. UNDP Assistant Resident Representative: Ms Thandi Gama 
28. UNDP Economist and Government Liaison Officer: Mr Jabulani Dlamini 
29. University of Swaziland (UNISWA): Lecturer: Mr Matthew Rajan 
30. University of Swaziland (UNISWA): Lecturer: Dr P.Q Magagula 
31. University of Swaziland (UNISWA): Lecturer: Ms Nomthetho Simelane 
32. University of Swaziland (UNISWA): Lecturer: Ms Nomsa Mndzebele 
33. University of Swaziland (UNISWA): Lecturer: Ms Thenjiwe Shimbira 
34. University of Swaziland (UNISWA) : Lecturer: Ms Thandi Khumalo 
35. University of Swaziland (UNISWA): Lecturer: Mr Patrick Mkhonta 
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Annexure III 
List of Stakeholders in the SME Policy 
1. Association of Swaziland Business Cooperatives (ASBC) 
2. BWAS Business Women's Association of Swaziland: 
3. CANGO Coordinating Assembly of NGOs 
4. Central Bank of Swaziland 
5. Enterprise Trust Fund 
6. European Union 
7. EU Micro Projects 
8. First National Bank 
9. Gwamile VOCTIM (Vocational College of Training and Industrial 
Management) 
1 O.lmbita Swaziland Women's Finance Trust 
11.lnhlanyelo Fund 
12. Institute of Development Management (10M) 
13. LULOTE Luhlelo Lolunotsisa Temabhizinisi 
14. Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives 
15. Ministry of Economic Planning and Development 
16. Ministry of Enterprise and Employment 
17. Ministry of Education 
18. Ministry of Finance 
19. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Trade and Promotion Unit (TPU» 
20. Ministry of Health 
21. Ministry of Home Affairs 
22. Ministry of Natural Resources 
23. Sibakho Chamber of Commerce 
24. Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) Unit 
25. Standard Bank of Swaziland 
26. Swaziland Association of Savings and Credit (SASSCO) 
27.Swaziland Business Growth Trust (SBGT) 
28. Swaziland College of Technology (SCOT) 
29. Swaziland Commercial Amadoda 
30. Swaziland Industrial Development Cooperation (SIDC) 
31.Swaziland Institute for Management and Public Administration (SIMPA) 
32.Swaziland Investment Promotion Authority (SIPA) 
33. Swazi National Business Council 
34. Swaziland Trucker's Association 
35. The Enterprise Fund 
36. Tibiyo TakaNgwane 
37. University of Swaziland (UNISWA) 
38. Women's Resource Centre (WRC): Umtapo WaboMake 
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